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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
GOVERNANCE IN A PROTECTIONIST WORLD:
THEORIZING WTO NEGOTIATING PERSPECTIVES
Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty*
Abstract: The current United States Administration will face
considerable challenges in the key areas of international trade law and policy.
In order to understand the future international trade architecture for the coming
decade, including in the World Trade Organization (WTO), it is essential to
understand the drivers of key trade strategies in leading economies. This article
explains the reasons why and the extent to which the negotiating perspective of
a country is determined by its ability to penetrate in global value chains,
embrace tariff reforms, and face the trade balance consequences. These abilities
may in turn influence a country’s willingness to impose anti-dumping or
subsidies and countervailing measures. Given the employment generation
capability of the manufacturing sector and the consequent domestic economic
compulsions, the WTO negotiations on freeing trade in this category have
progressed slowly. The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations
to reduce the high bound tariff to address tariff “overhang” reached a stalemate
in the last decade due to diverging perspectives of developed and developing
countries. In addition, developed countries have ceased using contingency
measures as policy instruments, and leading developing countries are taking
refuge by doing the same. In this context, this article explores the tariff and
contingency policies of two key developed countries (United States and
European Union) and developing countries (China and India), to gauge each
country’s willingness for future reforms. The perspective regarding
manufacturing competitiveness differs significantly among these countries,
which also shapes their manufacturing policy interventions. This article
concludes that, given the trade and industrial policy choices made by these
countries in recent past, it would be difficult to reach a WTO-induced
multilateral trade agreement on NAMA.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, trade policy dynamics have shaken the foundations
of international trade law and governance, in particular at the World Trade
Organization (WTO).1 The objective behind the establishment of the WTO
in 1995 was to secure a stable, transparent, and predictable framework for
facilitating cross-border movement of goods, services, service providers,
and investment. The provisions included in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) encouraged Member countries to commit to certain
reforms in 1995, to achieve greater predictability. Accordingly, for the
trade in goods, as decided at the Marrakesh Agreement (1994), these
countries made significant progress by “binding” their tariff lines by 1995.2
The bound tariff, which is the maximum import duty permissible on a
product in a country, was subject to periodic negotiations and downward
revisions. The Member countries were entitled to set their applied duties
freely, subject to the condition that they do not pass the upper limit set forth
by the WTO provisions. 3 The reforms in the developed countries were
expected to reduce the proportion of imports facing international peak tariff

1

See generally William Alan Reinsch, Salvaging the World Trade Organization, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/salvaging-world-tradeorganization; Jennifer Hillmann, A Reset of the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/report/reset-world-trade-organizations-appellatebody. See also Kristen Hopewell, Trump & Trade: The Crisis in the Multilateral Trading System, 26
NEW
POL.
ECON.
271,
271–82
(2020);
RAJ
BHALA,
Why
the
WTO Adjudicatory Crisis Will Not Be Easily Solved: Defining and Responding to “Judicial Activism,”
in THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WTO AND ITS REFORM, 111, 111–12 (Chang-fa Lo et al. eds., 2020).
2
See, e.g., Liliana Foletti et al., Smoke in the (Tariff) Water, 34 WORLD ECON. 248, 248–
64 (2011); David Laborde & Will Martin, Formulas for Failure? Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too
Ambitious for Success?, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 45, 45–65 (2015).
3
Pablo Klein-Bernard & Jorge A. Huerta-Goldman, The Cushioned Negotiation: The Case of
WTO’s Industrial Tariff Liberalization, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 847, 847–48 (2012).
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(IPT) from seven to five percent. 4 Conversely, the proportion of
developing country exports to their developed counterparts, subjected to
IPT, were expected to decline from nine to five.5 This disciplining of the
tariff structure of WTO Members, in both developed and developing
nations, created more certainty in the world trading system and facilitated
cross-border trade flows.6
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the participating countries
agreed to bind their tariff lines (i.e., to set an upper limit on the applied
tariff rate). It was expected that the member countries would agree to
negotiate their bound tariff rates at reasonable intervals and to lower them
accordingly, to ensure a reduction of protectionist intent. However, the
expectation on periodic reforms of the bound tariffs have remained
unfulfilled so far. Taking note of the member’s concerns, the fourth
Ministerial Meeting of the WTO at Doha (2001) pledged to control the
protectionist tendencies through reforms based on modalities decided
through mutual consensus. 7 There have been several rounds of
negotiations to reform the Agricultural and Non-agricultural Market
Access (NAMA) provisions in the aftermath of the Doha Ministerial
(2001),8 but given the difference in perspective among Member countries

4

In trade literature, a tariff rate above fifteen percent is defined as International Peak Tariff. U.N.
CONF. ON TRADE & DEV’T DIV. ON INT’L TRADE & COMMODITIES, KEY STATISTICS AND TRENDS IN
TRADE POLICY 2019: RETALIATORY TARIFFS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, at 9, U.N. Sales
No. E.20.II.D.13 (2020). See generally Amanda McBratney, Post-WTO China: Competition and
Technology Transfer Laws in the ‘New’ Socialist Market Economy, 12 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 1, 1–30 (2004).
5
WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 16 (2nd ed. 2001), https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf; see also, Prabhash Ranjan, Industrial Tariff Reduction: Why the Best
Might Still Turn Out to Be the Worst?, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 953, 953–66 (2008); Patrick Messerlin &
Erik van der Marel, Polly Wants a Doha Deal: What Does the Trade Community Think?, 10 WORLD
TRADE REV. 551, 551–55 (2011).
6
Kym Anderson, Contributions of the GATT/WTO to Global Economic Welfare: Empirical
Evidence, 30. J. ECON. SURVEYS 56, 56–92 (2016).
7
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN
(01)/DEC/1 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
8
For more information on the Doha Round, see Genevieve Dufour & David Pavot, WTO
Negotiations: The Unfinished Doha Development Agenda and the Emergence of New Topics, 15 GLOB.
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 244, 244 – 51. See also Dejen Yemane Messele, The Doha Negotiation Deadloc
k: Implications for the Future of Multilateralism, 1–14 (Addis Ababa Univ. Sch. of L. Working
Paper No. 3089718, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089718 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.308971
8.
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on the “coefficient 9 ” to be adopted, the reforms remain elusive. 10 The
delays in the reform process caused three specific concerns.
First, the countries reduced the applied tariff rates significantly from
1995 to 2020. The widened gap between the bound tariff set in 1995 and
the annually fluctuating applied duties is termed as “tariff overhang” or
“tariff water” in trade literature. 11 The wider “tariff overhang” enables
countries to increase applied tariffs in a WTO-compatible manner, on the
basis of perceived threats.12 In particular, the world has witnessed a series
of global and local recessions since the United States sub-prime crisis in
2008 to 2009. Many WTO Members have embraced “deglobalization” by
increasing tariffs, albeit temporarily.13 The recourse to higher tariff barriers
and lower trade volume became evident from recent trends, with serious
consequences for WTO-induced trade-led growth process.14
Second, given the slow progress of the WTO Doha Round
negotiations, including the pending bound tariff reforms, the attractiveness
of entering into regional trade agreements (RTAs) has grown during the
last two decades.15 Apart from the bilateral trade treaties and regional trade
agreements, three major mega-regional trade forums surfaced during the
last decade, namely: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, the megaregional blocs have faced their own challenges with the United States’ pull-

9
Coefficients are part of the mathematical method to negotiate on tariffs reduction. “Tariff
reductions for industrial products would be made using a ‘simple Swiss’ formula with separate
coefficients for developed or for developing country members. But whereas the coefficient for developed
members will be the same applicable to all of them, there will be a menu of options for developing
members that will apply according to the scale of the flexibilities they choose to use. The lower the
coefficient the higher the flexibilities and vice versa. A Swiss formula produces deeper cuts on higher
tariffs.” Non-agricultural market access (NAMA), WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/nama_e.htm.
10
The entire focus of the WTO negotiations subsequently shifted to determining “coefficients,”
i.e., the number by which the reforms should take place. A detailed discussion of the negotiations on
“coefficients” has been undertaken in Section 1A. See Sonia E. Rolland, Redesigning the Negotiation
Process
at
the
WTO,
13
J.
INT’L
ECON.
L.
65,
65–110
(2010);
David Laborde et al., Implications of the Doha Market Access Proposals for Developing Countries, 11
WORLD
TRADE
REV. 1, 1–25 (2012); Sebastian Hess & Stephan von Cramon‐Taubadel, A Meta‐
Analysis of General and Partial Equilibrium Simulations of Trade Liberalization under the Doha
Development Agenda, 31 WORLD ECON. 804, 804–40 (2008).
11
The tariff rates imposed by the member countries on imported varieties are known as applied
duties. Applied duties can change over the years, in line with the appropriate level of protection for
domestic industries as decided by the policymakers.
12
KYLE HANDLEY ET AL., RISING IMPORTS TARIFFS, FALLING EXPORT GROWTH: WHEN MODERN
SUPPLY CHAINS MEET OLD-STYLE PROTECTIONISM (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 2020).
13
Harold James, Deglobalization: The Rise of Disembedded Unilateralism, 10 ANN. REV. FIN.
ECON. 219, 220, 229–31 (2018).
14
See Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et al., The Return to Protectionism, 135 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1–55 (2020).
15
Shujiro Urata, Mega-FTAs and the WTO: Competing or Complementary?, 30 INT’L ECON. J.
231, 231–37 (2016).
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out from TPP in January 2017, 16 followed by India’s pull-out from the
RCEP in November 2019.17 Economic concerns dominated the pull-out
decisions. The United States was concerned with perceived unfair
arrangements 18 and India was concerned with a growing manufacturing
trade deficit.19 While the concluded regional trade agreements (RTAs) led
to considerable intra-bloc trade reforms, close observers raised
apprehensions that the future blocs, particularly the mega-regional forums,
would compete with the multilateral reform process and slow down the
pace and effectiveness of WTO negotiations.20
Third, historically developed countries had been the major users of
the contingency provisions, namely: anti-dumping and countervailing
duties. 21 Member countries can protect their domestic interests against
unfair trade practices, such as dumping, through “contingency” measures,
as allowed under the corresponding WTO provisions.22 The applied tariff
reforms over the last two and a half decades, under the influence of
multilateral, regional, and unilateral motivations, have exposed developing
countries to rising import flows. A number of developing countries are now
16

PASHA L. HSIEH, TRADE STRATEGIES OF THE TPP-11 COUNTRIES: ASIAN REGIONALISM IN
TURBULENT TIMES, 20–30 (Singapore Mgmt. Univ. ed., 2017).
17
Surendar Singh & Ram Singh, Domestic Sources of India’s Trade Policy Preferences in RCEP
Negotiations, 54 J. WORLD TRADE 503, 503 (2020).
18
Daniel C.K. Chow et al., How the United States Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Benefits China 2 (Univ. of Pa. J. of L. & Pub. Aff., Working Paper No. 451, 2018).
19
Press Release, Ministry of Com. & Indus., India Exploring Trade Agreements with USA & EU;
FTAs with Japan, Korea & ASEAN being Reviewed; No Trade Agreements in a Hurry Says Piyush
Goyal (Nov. 5, 2019) (on file with the Press Information Bureau).
20
Chad P. Bown, Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO, 8 GLOB. POL’Y
107, 107–12 (2017).
21
Dumping is a situation of international price discrimination, where the price of a product when
sold in the importing country is less than the price of that product in the market of the exporting country.
As explained by the WTO, “[i]f a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally
charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition?
Opinions differ, but many governments act against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries.
The WTO agreement does not pass judgement. It focuses on how governments can or cannot react to
dumping. It disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “AntiDumping Agreement.” This singular focus contrasts with the approach of the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement. See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Anti-Dumping, S
ubsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc., WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2021). The countervailing duties are relevant where a
country decides to launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as
“countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers. The WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures “disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates
the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. Under the agreement, a country can use
the WTO’s dispute-settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its
adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty
(“countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.” See
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
scm_e/scm_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2021). See also INGE NORA NEUFELD, ANTI-DUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING PROCEDURES: USE OR ABUSE?: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 1–
33, UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/10, U.N. Sales No. E.01.II.D.6 (2001).
22
See Derk Bienen et al., Does Antidumping Address “Unfair” Trade?, 28 INT’L TRADE J. 195,
197–99 (2014).
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on par with their developed counterparts in their use of these contingency
measures, often targeting imports coming from other developing
countries.23 Moreover, misuse of these provisions is often cited at the WTO
dispute settlement forum.24 The delayed disciplining of the contingency
provisions, particularly in the times of recession and rising protectionist
sentiment, presents a major challenge for the global trading system.25
Notwithstanding the delays in bound tariff reforms, a major outcome
of the applied tariff reforms over the last two decades has been the
considerable expansion of international production networks (IPNs),
which connect the manufacturing sectors across a wider range of countries.
The fragmentation of sequential production blocs enables multinational
corporations (MNCs) to locate various parts of their global value chain
(GVC) of manufacturing activities in suitable locations across countries.
The process is facilitated by tariff reforms, including both WTO-induced
and RTA-led initiatives. During this period, participation of developing
country in IPNs and GVCs has significantly increased. This participation
facilitates growth in their manufacturing sectors, “without having to
develop complete products or value chains.”26 However, possible recourse
to deglobalization measures (e.g., tariff rise, changes in trade policies
influencing supply chains), particularly in the post-COVID period, might
lead to a degree of disruption in the International Production Networks
(IPNs). 27 The post-pandemic responses may continue to influence the
future trade policy deliberations in the long run, although to a varying
degree in different countries.28
Global economic turbulence can facilitate multilateral trade policy
reforms. A case in point is the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (198694), the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted within

23
Jong Woo Kang & Dorothea Ramizo, Impact of Antidumping Measures on International Trade:
Growing South-South Tensions?, 29 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV. 334, 334 (2020); Julien
Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Normative Obsolescence of WTO Anti–Dumping Agreement—
Topography of the Global Use and Misuse of Anti-Dumping Measures, 6 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 233, 237–38
(2015).
24
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 art. 17, adopted Dec. 15, 1993, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
25
WORLD TRADE ORG. ECON. RSCH. & STAT. DIV., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2009: “TRADE
POLICY COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCY MEASURES” (2019), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report09_e.pdf.
26
PRZEMYSLAW KOWALSKI ET AL., PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND TRADE-RELATED POLICIES 11 (Tudy
Witbreuk et al. eds., 2015).
27
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., Covid-19 and International Trade: Issues and Actions, at 1–
7 (June 12, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-and-internationaltrade-issues-and-actions-494da2fa/.
28
Lukasz Gruszczynski, The Covid-19 Pandemic and International Trade: Temporary
Turbulence or Paradigm Shift?, 11 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 337, 342 (2020).

FALL 2021

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

7

the framework of the GATT.29 Initially, negotiations on reform modalities
were progressing slowly. However, the 1990–91 period was marked with
several disruptive events, leading to a global economic downturn. For
example, the Gulf War and oil price uncertainty, breakdown of the USSR,
credit crunch in the United States, banking crisis in Scandinavian
countries, bursting of an asset price bubble in Japan, and so on.30 In the
post-1991 period, the urge to conclude the Uruguay Round for facilitating
a trade-led recovery was strong in both developed and developing
countries. It is an interesting question whether the current post-COVID
scenario might hasten the much-delayed bound tariff reform process. It can
be argued that a country’s perspective towards multilateral tariff reforms
may be critically influenced by its trade performances (e.g., trade balance,
gainful GVC participation). Given this background, the current analysis
intends to explore the interrelation between trade performance, orientation
towards contingency measure adoption, and the resulting urge to go for
multilateral tariff reforms. To understand the orientation across
development profiles, this article focuses on the merchandise trade
experiences of two developed countries (European Union and United
States) and developing countries (China and India). The article
demonstrates that the negotiating perspective of a country (multilateral and
regional) is determined by ability to penetrate in GVCs, tariff reforms, and
trade balance consequences, which may influence the willingness of the
country to impose AD/SCM. The analysis is organized as follows. First,
the article covers the WTO discussions regarding bound tariff reforms and
the positions held by key countries. Second, the article discusses the
negotiations on the reform of contingency measure provisions. Third, the
article analyzes the country-level scenario on tariff reforms, GVC
participation, and recourse to trade remedy measures. Finally, based on the
findings, the article concludes with key policy conclusions on the future of
WTO NAMA negotiations.
I.

NAVIGATING TRADE LAW NEGOTIATIONS: THE NAMA
TARIFF REFORM

The NAMA negotiations were aimed at substantially reducing tariff
levels and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on imports and exports of most
goods, except for food products and cotton, while complying with the
objectives of the GATT and accounting for varying needs of different
29

See generally Greg Mastel, A Pragmatic Approach to Free Trade, in AMERICAN TRADE LAWS
AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 3, 6–8 (Rachel Hines ed., 1st ed. 1996). See also Hao Wu, Customs
Cooperation in the WTO: From Uruguay to Doha, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 843, 843–57 (2017).
30
Carlos Arteta et al., What Happens During Global Recessions?, in A DECADE AFTER THE
GLOBAL RECESSION: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FOR EMERGING AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 55, 57–
90 (M. Ayhan Kose & Franzika Ohnsorge eds., 2020).
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members. While negotiations before the Uruguay Round were largely
centered around ad valorem tariff reductions of developed countries, the
Uruguay Round saw developing countries rally for a more comprehensive
approach by binding commitments on tariffs and NTMs and expanding the
scope of covered sectors. 31 In 2001, the Doha Round directed the
implementation of the same to the Negotiating Group on Market Access
(NGMA). 32 Given that developing countries have a significantly higher
proportion of their GDP derived from the manufacturing sector, 33 the
outcomes of the NGMA had particular importance to them.
A.

The Post-Doha Period

In the post-Doha period, the negotiations on NAMA gathered
momentum and the Member countries broadly agreed to embrace a nonlinear, formula-based tariff reform schedule. It was agreed in the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) that the interest of the developing countries
would be protected by considering, “. . . the special needs and interests of
developing and least-developed country participants, including through
less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments, in accordance with the
relevant provisions of Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1994 . . .” 34 In other
words, lower tariff cuts were promised for developing countries in
exchange for the commitments, which are undertaken by the developed
countries. Application of a Swiss-type bound tariff reduction approach
emerged for this purpose:35
𝑇! =

𝑋 ∗ 𝑇"
(𝑋 + 𝑇" )

Where T1 is the final tariff, X is the given coefficient and T0 is the
initial tariff.

31

Murali Kallummal, NAMA Negotiations under the WTO: Real Concerns?, 34 SOC. SCIENTIST
34, 34–35 (2006).
32
The third Ministerial meeting of the WTO at Seattle in 1999 failed due to the difference in
negotiating perspectives between developed and developing countries. At the fourth Ministerial meeting
of WTO at Doha in 2001, the WTO Members agreed to re-launch the negotiations based on mutual
consensus on reform modalities to be agreed upon. The discussions are known as Doha Round.
33
International Trade Statistics 2005, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
statis_e/its2005_e/its05_toc_e.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). See also Wang Chao, China’s Preferential
Trade Remedy Approaches: A New Haven School Perspective, 21 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 103, 103–117
(2013).
34
Doha Declaration, supra note 7.
35
The bound tariffs are defined as the upper limits on applied duties for each product, as agreed
by the Member countries in their schedule of commitments at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
GATT. Under no circumstances can a country impose an applied duty in excess of the committed bound
rates.
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The importance of the coefficient to be used is as follows. With the
non-linearity involved, if a coefficient of five is adopted for the reform,
then irrespective of the initial bound rate (e.g., 50% or 100%), the final
bound rate in a member country would always be lower than the coefficient
considered. Given the importance of manufacturing sector in employment
creation and the political economy,36 the determination of the coefficient
emerged as a major point of contention in future negotiations.
During negotiations, China proposed an interesting modification to
the base Swiss formula, attempting to secure benefits from its relatively
reformed tariff profile. The introduction of A and P in the formula provided
China an advantage vis-à-vis other developing countries in the following
manner:37
𝑇! =

(𝐴 + 𝐵 ∗ 𝑃) ∗ 𝑇"
(𝐴 + 𝑃# ) + 𝑇"

Where, T1 and T0 are the final and initial bound rates respectively,
A is the simple average of base rates, P is the peak factor (P = T0 / A), and
B is the adjusting coefficient (e.g., for the years 2010 and 2015, B would
be three and one respectively). It can be shown that, by application of this
formula, a country characterized by already lower import tariff rates (i.e.,
deeper reforms) would not face a steep tariff cut. In addition, the proposal
supported the basic principle behind the sectoral approach but added that
“[m]embers shall be free to decide their participation in light of their own
needs.”38
In Annex B of the Cancún Ministerial Text (2003) draft, the Chair’s
Draft Elements of Modalities (TN/MA/W/35/Rev.1) were cited. The draft
focused on several aspects for future reforms.39 First, it proposed bound
duty reduction or elimination, on all non-agricultural products.40 Second,
2001 was proposed as the base year for the most favored nation (MFN)
applied tariff.41 Third, reform of the unbound tariff lines was proposed by
twice considering the MFN applied rate in the base year as its basis. For
incentivizing countries who had already undertaken deeper reforms in the
base year, an MFN applied rate lower than 2.5% or 5% was recommended
as the basis. 42 Fourth, now termed the sectoral approach, “a sector
36
Simeon Alder et al., Competitive Pressure and the Decline of the Rust Belt: A Macroeconomic
Analysis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20538, 2014).
37
See People’s Republic of China’s Proposal, Negotiating Group on Market Access—Market
Access for Non-Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/20 (Dec. 24, 2002).
38
Id. ¶ 6.
39
Draft Elements of Modalities for Negotiations on Non - Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. TN/
MA/W/35/Rev.1 (Aug. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Elements].
40
Draft Elements, supra note 39, ¶ B(6).
41
Id.
42
Draft Elements, supra note 39, ¶ (B)(7).

10

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 1

elimination approach is proposed with appropriate flexibilities for
developing countries, in order to eliminate and bind all tariffs on products
of particular export interest to developing and least-developed country
participants.” The following sectors were proposed for setting final bound
duty at “zero” under the sectoral approach: Electronics & Electrical goods;
Fish & Fish products; Footwear; Leather goods; Motor Vehicle parts &
components; Stones, Gems, & Precious Metals; and Textiles & Clothing,
with mixed interest on each among the developed and developing
countries.43 Fifth, LTFR was promised in terms of longer implementation
periods and flexibility of options to keep certain percentage of tariff lines
unbound.44 Finally, tariff reductions were proposed by a line-by-line basis,
using the following formula (Girard formula):45
𝑡! =

𝐵 ∗ 𝑡$ ∗ 𝑡"
(𝐵 ∗ 𝑡$ + 𝑡" )

Where, t1 would be the final ad valorem bound rate, t0 is the initial
bound rate, ta is the average of the bound rates, and B is a coefficient with
a unique value to be determined by the participants.
B.

The Derbez Draft Flexibilities

The “Derbez draft” (or Draft Cancún Ministerial Text) provided
further flexibilities by not forcing tariff binding or reduction commitments
on the least developed countries (LDCs) in the immediate future. 46
However, it was heavily criticized by developing countries for not
addressing their concerns. Two strong criticisms deserve mention. First,
the draft did not identify a value of “B,” leaving the negotiation openended. Second, the sectoral approach, which proposed setting tariff rates
equal to zero in seven manufacturing sectors, was considered a violation
of LTFR, as it would lead to developing countries conceding a higher
degree of tariff concessions. 47 The pace of negotiations suffered and
mistrust among the developing countries grew further when, Annex B was
presented to the WTO General Council in July 2004 and the text was found

43

Id. ¶ B(9).
Id. ¶ B(11)(a).
45
Id. ¶ B(7).
46
The “Derbez draft” was distributed at the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003. See World
Trade Organization, Preparations for the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, Draft
Cancún Ministerial Text Second Revision of 13 September 2003, WTO Doc. JOB(03)/150/
Rev.2 [hereinafter Cancún Ministerial Text].
47
Suparna Karmakar, New Contours of India’s Multilateral Engagement, 2 LAW & DEV. REV. 1,
17–19 (2009).
44
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to be exactly the same as that which had been rejected by developing
countries at Cancún.48
The NAMA negotiations aimed to minimize or remove tariffs. It was
also stated that the coverage of the products subjected to tariff reforms must
be extensive and without prior exclusions. Further, special needs and
preferences of developing countries and LDC participants were to be
considered, even by less than full reciprocity of reduction agreements.
Therefore, developing countries were authorized to reduce tariffs to a
lesser degree than developed countries and for a longer period of time.
Developing countries could choose: (1) lesser formula cuts of up to
10% of their tariff lines, which represented up to 10% of their import value;
or (2) to not apply formula cuts, or leave unbound tariff lines, for up to 5%
of their tariff lines representing up to 5% of their import value. 49
Developing countries with a binding coverage of less than 35% would be
exempt from formula reductions, but instead would contribute by binding
their tariffs at an average level.50
The Derbez text also noted the importance of exploring the balance
between the privileges of developed countries and those of newly acceded
countries. More liberalization in this context could also be pursued by
newly acceded countries. With respect to the sectoral approach, aimed at
reducing tariffs in selected industries, participants from the least-developed
countries were not expected to implement the formula cuts or to take part
in the sectoral approach.
The NAMA negotiations gradually revolved around the
determination of the coefficient “B,” which would shape the extent of tariff
reduction. Conversely, the European Union and the United States
submissions sought stronger commitments from developing countries. The
European Union’s proposal of applying a single coefficient (X = 10) for
both developed and developing countries was considered too stringent by
the developing countries. As a non-linear formula has been adopted for the
tariff cut, by the Swiss tariff-reduction formula, the new bound tariff rate
would always be lower than the coefficient used. As the European Union
called for the selection of a small coefficient to be the only coefficient for
applying the tariff cut, many developing countries feared that their new
bound rate would fall significantly below the current level of applied tariffs
across sectors. This would force them to implement an immediate
reduction of the applied tariff, with grave consequences for their national
48

See JOHN HILARY, THE DOHA DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AGENDA: NON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET
ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS AT THE WTO 10, https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp47_nama_
e.pdf.
49
A Simple Guide—NAMA Negotiations, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
50
Id.
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interest.51 The developing countries were therefore worried that the small
coefficient, as proposed by the EU, would marginally lower bound tariff in
the developed countries, while leading to a sharp decline of the same in
their territories. The United States agreed to offer a limited flexibility by
suggesting ten and fifteen for developed and developing countries
respectively.52 The focus in developed countries on single formula or two
close coefficients was guided by the significant tariff overhang53 in leading
developing countries, namely, Brazil, Egypt, India, Malaysia, and South
Africa.54 This contrasted with the United States’ opposition to the single
formula approach of the Uruguay Round, allowing required flexibilities for
developing countries.55
In contrast, the possibility of a sharp fall in bound tariffs raised
concerns among developing countries regarding an impending violation of
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). In line with the concern
expressed by other developing countries, India emphasized the need to
adopt two different coefficients for developed and developing countries, to
secure the LTFR commitment. 56 The country also collaborated with
several other developing countries through the NAMA-11 forum 57
regarding the need for extending SDT to developing countries. 58
Moreover, as part of the Argentina, Brazil, and India (ABI) forum,
developing countries stressed the adoption of the Girard formula (i.e., a
modified Swiss) for tariff cuts. The proposal also argued that the unbound
tariff lines, in the post-binding period, should not be subjected to formula
cuts.59 This perspective received support from other developing countries

51

MOONSUNG KANG, UNITED NATIONS ESCAP, FORMULAS FOR INDUSTRIAL TARIFF REDUCTION
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2005), https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/polbrief5.pdf.
52

Communication from the United States, Swiss Formula with Dual Coefficients, WTO Doc.
JOB(05)/36 (Mar. 21, 2005).
53
“The excess of a country's tariff binding over its applied tariff, called tariff overhang, reflects
the amount of flexibility available to a country at a point in time. The model’s predictions about the
relationship between tariff bindings, tariff overhang, and country characteristics can then be tested
empirically.” Mostafa Beshkar et al., Tariff Binding and Overhang: Theory and Evidence, 97 J. INT’L
ECON. 1, 2 (2015).
54
HILARY, supra note 48, at 14.
55
MARTIN KHOR & GOH CHIEN YEN, THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON NON-AGRICULTURAL
MARKET ACCESS: A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 10 (Third World Network 2006).
56
See Communication from India: Addendum, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products,
Doc. TN/MA/W/10/Add.3 (Apr. 10, 2003).
57
A negotiating group of developing countries at the WTO negotiations on NAMA whose
common agenda was protection of developing country interests. The member countries included:
Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, and Tunisia.
Communication from Egypt et al., Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, WTO Doc.
TN/MA/W/31 (Mar. 25, 2003).
58
Id.
59
See Communication to the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural Market Access from
Argentina, Brazil and India, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/54
(Apr. 15, 2005).
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as well.60 The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration summarized the ongoing
debate as follows:
. . . many Members engaged in an exchange on the
basis of an approach with two coefficients. In the context of
such debates, the coefficients which were mentioned for
developed Members fell generally within the range of 5 to
10, and for developing Members within the range of 15 to
30, although some developing Members did propose lower
coefficients for developed Members and higher coefficients
for developing Members. In addition, a developing country
coefficient of 10 was also put forward by some developed
Members. However, while this discussion of numbers is a
positive development, the inescapable reality is that the
range of coefficients is wide and reflects the divergence that
exists as to Members’ expectations regarding the
contributions that their trading partners should be making.61
While it became apparent that developing countries were not going
to accept a single formula approach, a compromise of two coefficients
posed issues as well, as “[a] ‘Swiss formula with two coefﬁcients’ will be
in violation of paragraph 14 of the HK Declaration.62” In the next couple
of years, the Negotiating Group on Market Access (NGMA) of the WTO
remained busy in reaching common ground, with submissions pouring in
from the both sides of development spectrum. 63 In February 2008, the
WTO attempted to reach a compromise by proposing the following
formula to be applied on a line-by-line basis:64
𝑡! =

(𝑎 𝑜𝑟 𝑏) ∗ 𝑡"
(𝑎 𝑜𝑟 𝑏) + 𝑡"

Where t1 and t0 are the final and initial bound duties, a = 8 – 9:
coefficient for developed countries and b = 19 – 23: coefficient for
developing countries.
60

See Communication from Malaysia, Negotiating Group on Market Access—Proposal for
Treatment of Unbound Tariffs, WTO Doc. JOB(05)/86 (May 26, 2005).
61
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration: Annexes of December, 2005, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(05)/DEC.
62
Prabhash Ranjan, Industrial Tariffs and South Asia: Interpreting for Development 19 (Ctr. for
Trade & Dev. (Centad), Working Paper No. 5, 2006).
63
The negotiations covered wider grounds, e.g., the question of preference erosion for the LDCs.
However, the current paper focuses on the tariff reform coefficient question, involving key developed
and developing countries.
64
World Trade Organization Negotiating Group on Market Access, Draft Modalities for NonAgricultural Market Access, WTO Doc. No. TN/MA/W/103 (Feb. 8, 2008).
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The February 2008 draft also called for the binding of unbound tariff
lines by applying a constant, non-linear mark-up of twenty or thirty,
considering 2001 as base year for subsequent tariff reductions. Developing
countries were allowed certain flexibilities in terms of applying a lower
level of formula cuts and thereby keeping, as an exception, a certain
percent of tariff lines unbound. While the participation in sectoral
initiatives was noted as non-mandatory, it was clarified in the draft that,
“Such initiatives shall aim to reduce, harmonize or as appropriate eliminate
tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs
and tariff escalation, over and above that which would be achieved by the
formula modality, on products of export interest to developing Members.”
But despite potential export gains, the sharp tariff reduction possibilities
made the draft much less attractive to developing countries from the Global
South.65 Developed countries interest in the draft waivered as well; the
European Union and United States were unhappy with the flexibilities
incorporated therein.
Given the lukewarm responses and the subsequent negotiations,
NGMA came out with another revised draft modalities in December
2008,66 with the following tariff reform formula:
𝑡! =

{𝑎 𝑜𝑟 (𝑥 𝑜𝑟 𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑧)} ∗ 𝑡"
{𝑎 𝑜𝑟 (𝑥 𝑜𝑟 𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑧)} + 𝑡"

Where t1 and t0 are the final and initial bound duties, a = 8:
coefficient for developed countries and x = 20, y = 22, z = 25: coefficient
for developing countries, to be chosen as provided in paragraph 7.
Paragraph 7 of the “December 2008 Draft” 67 put forward by the
NGMA of the WTO defined the detailed flexibility provisions involving
developing countries for adopting a particular coefficient. For instance, to
adopt x = 20, the permissible options were:
. . . less than formula cuts for up to 14 percent of nonagricultural national tariff lines provided that the cuts are no
less than half the formula cuts and that these tariff lines do
not exceed 16 percent of the total value of a Member's nonagricultural imports; or, keeping, as an exception, tariff lines
unbound, or not applying formula cuts for up to 6.5 percent
65

David Laborde, Sectoral Initiatives in the Doha Round, in UNFINISHED BUSINESS? THE WTO’S
DOHA AGENDA 277, 277–79 (Will Martin & Aaditya Mattoo eds., 2011).
66
Revision, Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, WTO Doc.
No. TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (Dec. 6, 2008).
67
WTO AGRICULTURE: NEGOTIATIONS, CHAIRPERSON’S TEXTS 2008 (Dec. 9, 2008),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm.
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of non-agricultural national tariff lines provided they do not
exceed 7.5 percent of the total value of a Member's nonagricultural imports.
Similar conditionalities were proposed in lieu of using coefficients
22 and 25 as well. Essentially, choosing a higher tariff reform coefficient
would force developing countries to adopt deeper reform commitments
otherwise. In addition, while participation in sectoral reforms remained
non-mandatory, it was noted that:
. . . for some Members, sectoral initiatives that reach
a critical mass of participation will help to balance the
overall results of the negotiation on non-agricultural market
access, which includes the coefficients in paragraph 5 and
the levels of flexibilities and related provisions of paragraph
7. At the time of establishment of modalities, the Members
listed in Annex 7 have agreed to participate on a selfidentified basis, in negotiating the terms of sectoral tariff
initiatives, with a view to making them viable.
Finally, the draft advocated binding of unbound tariff lines by
applying a constant, non-linear mark-up of twenty-five percent, by
considering 2001 as base year, for subsequent tariff reductions.
C.

WTO Negotiations in a Stalemate

While there has been significant work and some progress since the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the member States missed the
deadline set in the Hong Kong Declaration.68 Issues in NAMA that still
need to be discussed, include the following:
• Members continue to disagree as to what products should be
included in the Modalities of NAMA.
• LDCs are removed from the implementation of a tariff reduction
formula. However, a reduction in the margin of choice enjoyed by
LDCs and, by extension, their access to the market to developing
and developed countries would “erode” if tariffs are substantially
lowered for goods of export interest to LDCs.
• Members are split about how to handle unbound tariff mark-ups.

68
Addendum, Textual Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, on the State of
Play of the NAMA Negotiations, WTO Doc. No. TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3/Add.1 (Apr. 21, 2011).
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• The Draft of Modalities of July 2007 proposed specific flexibility
recommendation, but no consensus was found.
• The revised Draft Modalities clarify that progress was made in the
detection, analysis, and categorization of NTBs. It should be noted
that, in general, LDCs have not informed their NTBs and have not
been consistently involved in discussions on NTBs, although this is
an area that is supposed to affect LDC's market access.
The United States has recently called for a “broad reset” of the WTO
tariff commitment, arguing that the presently obsolete tariff decisions are
stuck in a place that no longer serve the political choices and economic
conditions of the Member States. The overall simple average bound rate of
the United States is currently 3.4%, which is among the lowest for major
developed countries and has remained relatively unchanged for more than
a decade. By comparison, the average tariff levels for India and Brazil are
50.8% and 31.4%, respectively.69 Moreover, India has proposed that the
upper tariff limits for several products of interest, namely information
technology products, be renegotiated at the WTO.70 These proposed steps
present a lucrative opportunity for the domestic sector under initiatives
such the “Make-in-India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan,” in which
India has promoted its domestic production of goods in selected
manufacturing segments. The United States has noted that under the
“Make-in-India” initiative, the government has raised duties on two broad
groups of products to encourage domestic production: (1) an assortment of
labor-intensive products; and (2) electronics and communications devices,
including mobile phones, televisions, and associated parts and
components. 71 Similarly, the industrial policies introduced under the
“Made in China 2025” initiative have already caught the eye of United
States policy makers. These policies include tax preferences, forced joint
ventures, and the devolution of subsidies might fluctuate distort prices in
other developing economies and further benefit the Chinese entities. 72
Qualitative steps, which affect United States businesses trading in China,
69

WORLD TRADE ORG. ET AL., WORLD TARIFF PROFILES 2020 (2020). See also Julien Chaisse &
Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade Order—A Proposal
to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013). See
also Jaydeep Mukherjee, Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Deconstructing Services and
Investment Negotiating—A Case Study of India at WTO GATS and Investment Fora, 14 J. WORLD INV.
& TRADE, 44, 44–78 (2013). See also Wei Yin, Challenges, Issues in China-EU Investment Agreement
and the Implication on China’s Domestic Reform, 26 ASIA PAC. L. REV 2, 170–202 (2018).
70
Asit Ranjan Mishra, India Seeks Tariff Renegotiations at WTO, MINT (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-seeks-tariff-renegotiations-at-wto-11608139820851.html.
71
ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER, THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2019
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 236 (2019).
72
KAREN SUTTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 10964, “MADE IN CHINA 2025” INDUSTRIAL POLICIES:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2020).
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have been proposed by both the United States and China. But the first signs
of a ceasefire were seen when the two sides signed the Phase One
Agreement in January 2020, which formally negotiated the rollback of
tariffs, the extension of trade purchases, and renewed obligations on
intellectual property, transfer of technologies, and currency activities.
II.

TRADE REMEDIES: THE NEED TO REMEDY REFORM

In 2001, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) set a goal to clarify
and improve disciplines under the Anti-Dumping/Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (AD/SCM). Ever since the constructive
engagement of these Measures was achieved in the WTO Hong Kong
Ministerial in 2005, there have been several continued discussions in 2007
and 2008 based on the AD/SCM drafts. However, in 2010, it was reported
that a “consensus” was unlikely to be achieved easily. 73 The issue has
remained contentious due to the polarized opinions among member
countries within the DDA. Some nations have advocated for anti-dumping
and other reforms, while others have opposed them. Another contentious
issue has been the disputed Non-Market Economy (NME) status of China,
which rests on the differences in interpreting section 15(a)(ii) of China's
WTO accession protocol. The United States Department of Commerce
continues to give China the NME status,74 despite some stakeholder groups
advocating against this designation to avoid complicating trade relations
with China.75
A.

Trade Remedy Measure Negotiations

The United States has participated in bilateral and multilateral
forums with its trading partners to resolve trade-related issues. 76 To
address potential adverse consequences, United States federal laws allow
for trade relief initiatives on "unfair" foreign trade policies in the domestic
market. These may include safeguard measures such as anti-dumping and
countervailing duties or reduction of the influx of reasonably priced
imports that impair national security. In fact, with each of its trade
agreements, the United States has held bilateral negotiations to resolve
73

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40606, TRADE REMEDIES AND THE WTO RULES NEGOTIATIONS 1 (2010).
Mirek Tobiáš Hošman, China’s NME Status at the WTO: Analysis of the Debate, 20 J. INT’L
TRADE L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2021). See also WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 10385, CHINA'S
STATUS AS A NONMARKET ECONOMY (2019). On the broader issues raised by China NME status, see
Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu & Tianzhu Han, China’s Market Economy Dilemma and its Interplay with EU
Anti-Dumping Law, 27 ASIA PAC. L. REV 1, 102–26 (2019).
75
Hošman, supra note 74, at 1–20.
76
See Weihuan Zhou, China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the WTO: A
Preliminary Assessment, 5 CHINESE J. COMPAR. L.345, 345–64 (2017).
74
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conflicts and to increase consumer reach for United States companies.
More often, however, the United States has reverted to a multilateral forum
for the resolution of trade disputes established by the WTO or its precursor,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As part of the
dispute settlement process, WTO members may seek authorization to
retaliate if trading partners maintain measures determined to be
inconsistent with WTO rules.77
B.

China’s Non-Market Economy Status

The question of the nature of the Chinese economy—or more
precisely the question of whether China operates as a market economy—
is complex. Until now, China has been treated as a non-market economy
(NME). In fact, Chinese exports are still subject to special conditions
imposed when China joined the WTO in 2001. Under the formal legal
criteria at the time, China did not meet the criteria of a market economy;
this resulted in the provisional implementation (for fifteen years) of
specifically binding anti-dumping measures. These provisions expired in
December 2016. However, the fundamental problem is that the criteria
used to determine these market mechanisms are individually specified by
the countries because the WTO does not offer any formal definition. As a
result, each WTO member can have its own definition, which results in
very heterogeneous treatments of Chinese exports. In fact, the NME
methodology is an arbitrary and punitive instrument. 78 Without much
surprise, this complex situation led to disputes between China and many
other key members such as the European Union, the United States, and
Japan.
On an appeal from China, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body agreed
in 2016 to stay proceedings on a trade dispute, launched by China against
the European Union, regarding China’s non-market economy position in
anti-dumping proceedings. 79 In the late 1990s, China was a mid-sized
economy and many WTO members, most prominently the United States,
made China's effort to join the multilateral organization very difficult. This
may have been the hardest accession deal in the history of the
GATT/WTO. The major point of discussion during the accession talks was
77
ANDRES SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 10958, U.S. TRADE DEBATES: SELECT
DISPUTES AND ACTIONS (2021).
78
James J. Nedumpara, China’s Market Economy Status in WTO: In a State of Abeyance,
FINANCIAL EXPRESS (July 8, 2019), https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/chinas-marketeconomy-status-wto-state-abeyance/1636350/.
79
See generally Weihuan Zhou, China’s Litigation on Non-Market Economy Treatment at the
WTO: A Preliminary Assessment, 5 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 345 (2017). See also Weihuan Zhou, The Issue
of ‘Particular Market Situation’ Under WTO Anti-dumping Law, in NON-MARKET ECONOMIES IN THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 185, 198–200 (James Nedumpara & Weihuan Zhou eds., 2018).
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the treatment of China as a non-market economy (NME) after its entrance
into the WTO.80 These WTO negotiations will enforce the main values of
supply and demand for goods and services in the markets, without being
limited by government intervention.
In anti-dumping situations, the non-market economy technique
allows countries, who agrees to undertake WTO anti-dumping
investigations, the extra freedom to disregard domestic costs and rates. For
the last few decades, this technique has been used indiscriminately against
China.
When domestic transactions are defined as inaccurate or irregular,
expense and sales data are often used in the creation of home market rates.
Chinese costs and rates have been routinely dismissed or disregarded in
most anti-dumping proceedings, on the grounds of the special treatment of
NMEs. Most anti-dumping bodies have also looked at “surrogate” or thirdcountry evidence in assessing the Chinese costs and prices. As several
criticisms against the United States’ practice of duty determination under
NME scenario surfaced, 81 the Chinese representation against the same
have hardened as well.
C.

Recent WTO Cases on Tariff & Contingency Measures

Under the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, a protesting member may,
in the case of a trade dispute between WTO members, request the creation
of a tribunal composed of three persons to decide on the dispute.82 The
panel is responsible for reviewing the accuracy of the suspected
infringement of WTO agreements and providing a report to be addressed
by the parties to the conflict, after the adoption by the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). If one of the parties to the dispute does not recognize the
panel's report, it will bring an appeal before the Appellate Body against the
panel's legal conclusions. A three-member chamber hears each appeal; this
panel may retain, amend, or reverse the legal decisions of the panel. Recent
tariff cases with ongoing proceedings in the WTO are:

80
“The issue of China’s market economy status (MES) has been described as ‘the mother of all
trade issues now.’” Antonia Hmaidi, Is China a Market Economy?, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG (Jan. 22,
2016), https://ged-project.de/globalization/is-china-a-market-economy/; see Hošman, supra note 74, at
1–20; see also Ngangjoh-Hodu & Han, supra note 74, at 74.
81
Adam Williams, What a Dump! The Current State of Antidumping Duty Calculations in NonMarket Economy Cases, 32 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 433, 438 (2018).
82
William J. Davey, The First Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Dealing with Controversy and
Building Confidence, in A HISTORY OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 353, 368–73 (Gabrielle Marceau ed., 2015).
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• China’s Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty measures on
Barley from Australia.83
• Colombia’s Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium,
Germany, and the Netherlands.84
• India's Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods in the Information and
Communications Technology Sector, where Taiwan claimed that
India’s measures appear to be inconsistent with Articles II:1(a) and
II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Subsequently, the consultations were
joined by Japan, the U.S., Singapore, Canada, and the European
Union.85
Contingency mechanisms, or legal “stop valves,” enable countries
to cancel or waive trade agreements and affect the global economy if the
WTO is exploited for protectionist purposes. The most recently settled
disputes on these measures were between the European Union and Russia,
and Australia and Indonesia, regarding alleged breaches of anti-dumping
agreements.
The dispute between the European Union and Russia concerned two
aspects of the European Union’s anti-dumping practice: (1) the adjustment,
by the European Commission, of input costs incurred by investigated
producers and exporters; and (2) specific determinations made by the
European Union in two Expiry Reviews. The Panel disagreed with Russia
that the European Union had breached the Anti-Dumping Agreement by
finding that there was a likelihood of recurrence of dumping and injury if
the anti-dumping measures were to lapse.86
The dispute between Australia and Indonesia concerned Australia’s
anti-dumping measures imposed on A4 copy paper exported from
Indonesia, following an investigation by the Australian Anti-Dumping
Commission. One of Indonesia’s claims in this dispute concerned a clause
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which Australia had allegedly breached.
The Panel recommended that Australia bring its measure into conformity
with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, the
Panel denied Indonesia's request to suggest ways in which Australia could
implement the recommendations.87
83
Communication from Canada, China—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on
Barley from Australia, WTO Doc. WT/DS598/3 (Jan. 6, 2021).
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Panel Report, European Union—Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping
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UNDERSTANDING THE GROUND REALITY: TOPOGRAPHY
OF TARIFF POLICIES

This section delves into the actualities of tariff policies by first
analyzing the current sectoral trend in policies originating in the European
Union, the United States, China, and India, respectively. The second
subsection discusses with the surge in participation of these countries in
Global Value Chains (GVCs), the resulting economic effects, and the
reasons for the difference in these effects between the four countries. The
last subsection discusses the scenario and dynamics of their contingency
interventions.
A.

The Tariff Scenario

To understand the possible orientations of the four leading
economies (China, the European Union, India, and the United States)
towards future reforms, it is necessary to analyze the trends in their tariff
policies. Long time-series data on sector-level tariff patterns can be drawn
from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database.88 A total of
sixteen sectors at the harmonized system (HS) 89 two-digit classification
(i.e., at the Chapter level) have been identified for this analysis, all of which
are heavily traded and crucially integrated with Global Value Chains.90
The analysis was conducted in the following manner: The tariff data
from WITS at the Harmonized System (HS) two-digit level were obtained
in both simple and weighted average forms. The Simple Average Tariff
(SAT) was reached by dividing the sum of all the applied tariff lines in a
country within the selected product category by the number of tariff lines.
The Weighted Average Tariff (WAT) was computed in the
following manner. The applied tariffs at HS six-digit, Sub-Heading level,
were first multiplied by the sectoral import shares under the corresponding
product lines. Then the trade-weighted tariffs were added together to derive
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The WITS database provides detailed data on tariffs, non-tariff barriers, value of imports, and
other trade-related categories for 223 countries. The data is available from 1962 onwards. WORLD BANK,
WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOLUTION (WITS), http://wits.worldbank.org/.
89
Among industry classification systems, Harmonized System Codes are commonly used
throughout the export process for goods. The Harmonized System is a standardized numerical method
of classifying traded products. It is used by customs authorities around the world to identify products
when assessing duties and taxes and for gathering statistics.
90
The value chain represents the set of basic and supporting activities and processes necessary to
produce and deliver a product or service through all phases of its life cycle, from design to use. See Vilas
Pathikonda & Thomas Farole, The Capabilities Driving Participation in Global Value Chains 2–3
(World Bank, Working Paper No. 7804, 2016).
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the WAT. 91 The current analysis obtained the SAT and WAT data as
computed by WITS.
Suppose for a sector, for example leather products, the WAT is
found to be higher vis-à-vis the SAT. This can occur only when higher
tariff rates are being applied by a certain country on products characterized
by relatively higher import flows. In other words, the relatively lower
WAT level over SAT level implies that a higher proportion of trade is
taking place through relatively freer tariff lines, indicating deeper reforms.
Hence, an observed higher WAT for a sector in a country signifies greater
protectionist intent. The use of trade-weighted applied tariffs, rather than
simple applied tariffs, is to gauge whether trade is taking place through the
lower-duty tariff lines. For all the four members, China, the European
Union, India, and the United States, the average applied tariffs between
2001–2010 and 2011–2018 have been compared to understand the changes
in the tariff rates over time. While the former period denotes the Doha
Round negotiation phase, the latter period shows the stalemate era.
The orientation of these four WTO Members towards tariff-led
protectionist policies can be observed in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents
the tariff profile for developed countries. Several observations can be noted
for the European Union. First, barring the exception of inorganic
chemicals, pharma, and copper, the WAT is higher as compared to the
SAT, underlining the trade policy orientation.92 Second, the average WAT
is more than five percent during the second period, but only for apparel and
footwear products, illustrating the bloc’s orientation to protect relatively
labor-intensive sectors. Finally, in only five industries, namely inorganic
and organic chemicals, footwear, copper products, machinery, and
equipment, has the average WAT risen in the latter period, indicating a
growing protectionist intent.
The situation in the United States is also observed from Table 1. The
United States differs from the European Union in terms of policy
orientation. First, barring the exception of the inorganic chemicals and
plastic sector, for all the HS codes up to 64 (i.e., footwear), the WAT is
higher than the corresponding SAT. In other words, the United States’
tariff protectionism is more pronounced in the low-to-mid capital-intensive
segments. Second, in the post-2011 period, the average WAT only crossed
five percent for leather, apparel, and footwear products. Finally, in a total
of nine sectors—inorganic chemicals, plastic, rubber, leather, apparels,
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MIA MIKIC & JOHN GILBERT, TRADE STATISTICS IN POLICYMAKING—A HANDBOOK OF
COMMONLY USED TRADE INDICES AND INDICATORS 102–03 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for
Asia & the Pac. rev. ed. 2009) (2007).
92
See Asif H. Qureshi, Interpreting Exceptions in the WTO Agreement: Lessons from the New
Haven School, 22 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 3, 3–23 (2014).
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footwear, iron and steel products, and machinery and equipment—the
average WAT increased in the latter period.
Table 2 presents the tariff scenario for China and India. First, for
China, the WAT is higher than the corresponding SAT, but only in the case
of copper products, vehicles, and transport equipment and other
instruments. Second, the WAT is lower than 5% in the second period, but
only in the case of inorganic and organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, iron
and steel, machinery and equipment, and electrical equipment. Finally, the
average WAT increased in the latter period, but only for iron and steel
articles, and copper products.
Yet, for India, the WAT is only higher than the SAT in
pharmaceuticals, rubber, leather, and footwear. Additionally, the average
WAT in post-2011 period is lower than 5% only in case of copper products
and electrical equipment. Finally, for all the sectors, the average WAT is
observed to be in decline in the latter period.
A few observations regarding the tariff profile of these four
countries deserve mention. First, as observed from the raw data, all the four
countries have witnessed a general increase in applied tariff rates in several
sectors during the last two years. Second, among the developed countries,
tariff activism93 is relatively higher within the United States, though tariff
on pharmaceutical imports is quite reformed in both the European Union
and the United States. Third, the general European Union-United States
orientation is towards the protection of low-to-mid tech products, which
are of primary export interest for developing countries. Fourth, the
incidence of a higher WAT is less acute for China and India, when
compared to their developed counterparts. As the developed countries are
generally characterized by lower-than-average customs tariffs on their
import flows, it is possible that, for several product groups, the
importations might be happening despite higher tariffs. One possible
reason behind this is the presence of skewed demand patterns in the import
market. Alternatively, the products characterized by lower duties might
also have certain NTBs on the imports, which either prohibit or restrict
import flows within these categories. 94 Finally, despite a rise in certain
sectors, both China and India witnessed a general decline in average WAT
rates, showing an orientation towards tariff reforms. This observation
underlines the prevailing protectionist intent in these four leading players,
albeit to varying degrees.
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“Tariff activism” can be perceived to be operational in a country if there are several instances
of interventions by the policymakers to protect the national interest through the tariff instrument, at the
behest of the primary or manufacturing sector players or lobbying groups.
94
Gianluca Orefice, Non‐Tariff Measures, Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction, 40
WORLD ECON. 1807, 1807–1835 (2017).
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One prime distinction between the four WTO Members selected for
the current analysis, however, is reflected in the status of their nonagriculture tariff binding. This is evidenced from the following: China
(100%), European Union (100%), India (70.1%), and the United States
(100%).95 While the other three countries (China, the European Union, and
the United States) need not bother with the choice of the NAMA
coefficient, India may be concerned with the selection of a tariff binding
formula and the immediate implications on the corresponding applied
duties. Previously, with the Indian position in mind, during the NAMA
negotiations the European Union proposed that, “all WTO Members other
than the least developed countries [must] have as close to 100 percent
bindings as possible.” 96 The United States also has taken note and put
pressure on India, as “. . . nearly 30 percent of India’s non-agricultural
tariffs remain unbound.”97 During 2019 and 2020, the pressure on India
was particularly high, when the then United States President Donald
Trump used the expression “Tariff King” while referring to the country.98
India, however, has long tried to negotiate breathing space through the
introduction of flexibility in WTO provisions, where, “developing
countries must have the freedom to leave unbound up to ten percent of the
tariff lines that were hitherto unbound and were considered sensitive or
strategically important.”99 Given the reservations towards a possible sharp
decline in manufacturing tariffs, the Indian policymakers have so far
adopted a cautious approach in setting manufacturing tariff and other
policies. Most of the recent manufacturing sector related policy
deliberations in India (e.g., a high level of import tariffs, complexities in
product standards, local content requirements mandated under the
“Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan” and so on) need to be viewed in this
broader context.100 Both the developed as well as developing economies
have expressed concerns over these practices during the recent Trade
Policy Review meeting on India in January 2021.101
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WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 69.
European Communities, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. No. 026017 (Oct. 31, 2002).
97
LIGHTHIZER, supra note 71.
98
Amitendu Palit & Deeparghya Mukherjee, India’s Tariffs and Implications for Indo-US Trade
Prospects, 575 INST. S. ASIAN STUD. 1, 2 (2019).
99
Anwarul Hoda & Monika Verma, Market Access Negotiations on Non-Agricultural Products:
India and the Choice of Modalities 23 (Indian Council for Rsch. on Int’l Econ. Rel., Working Paper No.
132, 2004).
100
Govt fixes minimum percentage of local content in 55 chemical, pesticides, BUS. STANDARD
(June 2, 2020), https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/govt-fixes-minimumpercentage-of-local-content-in-55-chemical-pesticides-120060201321_1.html.
101
Sidhartha, China raises India’s FDI checks at WTO, TIMES INDIA (Jan. 7, 2021, 9:58 A.M.),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/china-raises-indias-fdi-checks-atwto/articleshow/80146401.cms.
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Table 1: Comparing the Effective Applied Tariff (AHS) Reforms—
European Union and the United States102
European Union
Description

Simple Average
Tariff

United States

Weighted
Average Tariff

Simple Average
Tariff

Weighted
Average Tariff

2001-10 2011-18 2001-10 2011-18 2001-10 2011-18 2001-10 2011-18
Inorganic
Chemicals

2.23

2.31

1.50

1.63

1.50

1.51

0.59

0.70

Organic
Chemicals

2.10

2.45

2.35

2.82

2.71

2.83

3.19

3.04

Pharmaceuticals

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.06

0.12

0.00

0.00

Plastic Articles

2.11

2.42

3.53

3.52

2.80

3.07

2.34

2.63

Rubber Articles

0.97

1.09

1.57

1.44

1.27

1.37

1.73

1.87

Leather Products 1.19

1.48

3.22

2.88

5.15

5.07

7.88

8.14

Apparels, knitted
5.52
or crocheted

4.44

6.32

5.52

12.20

9.83

11.52

10.85

Apparels, not
knitted or
crocheted

5.22

4.31

7.14

6.21

9.27

7.51

8.79

8.89

Footwear
Products

4.55

4.04

8.34

8.86

9.23

7.95

11.45

11.99

Iron and Steel

0.75

0.13

0.81

0.17

0.39

0.13

0.30

0.13

Articles of Iron
and Steel

0.66

0.76

1.37

1.33

0.99

1.05

1.02

1.09

Copper Products 1.50

1.45

0.49

0.52

1.35

1.46

0.66

0.68

Machinery and
Equipment

0.47

0.62

0.63

0.69

0.77

0.85

0.45

0.51

Electrical
Machinery and
Equipment

0.79

0.88

1.62

1.01

0.95

1.08

0.67

0.64

102

Computed by Authors from WITS.
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Vehicles and
Transport
Equipment

2.28

2.29

6.54

4.27

1.43

1.59

1.15

1.11

Various
instruments

0.52

0.57

0.86

0.65

0.94

0.95

0.64

0.55

Table 2: Comparing the Effective Applied Tariff (AHS) Reforms—China
and India103
China
Description

Simple Average
Tariff

India

Weighted
Average Tariff

Simple Average
Tariff

Weighted
Average Tariff

2001-10 2011-18 2001-10 2011-18 2001-10 2011-18 2001-10 2011-18
Inorganic
Chemicals

5.47

4.54

6.24

3.85

17.76

6.76

15.17

5.93

Organic
Chemicals

5.90

4.96

5.68

3.43

17.58

6.80

15.69

6.01

Pharmaceuticals

4.86

3.71

4.59

3.42

18.22

9.26

18.71

9.61

Plastic Articles

9.31

6.38

8.86

5.21

18.33

8.43

17.76

7.23

Rubber Articles

11.18

9.11

13.12

7.87

18.88

9.52

19.46

9.94

Leather Products 14.79

11.22

13.64

9.74

18.78

9.25

18.88

9.70

Apparels, knitted
16.39
or crocheted

12.25

13.14

8.34

19.52

8.34

19.36

8.22

Apparels, not
knitted or
crocheted

16.77

12.51

15.28

11.46

20.78

8.05

20.30

6.23

Footwear
Products

18.09

14.18

14.60

6.04

18.61

10.21

18.64

10.23

Iron and Steel

5.68

4.74

4.88

3.63

21.10

6.35

21.17

5.12

Articles of Iron
and Steel

9.79

8.16

7.55

7.72

18.73

9.21

18.69

9.06
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Copper Products 6.13

5.03

7.55

7.72

16.50

6.10

15.78

4.07

Machinery and
Equipment

7.99

6.01

5.24

3.54

15.71

6.59

13.68

5.51

Electrical
machinery and
Equipment

7.71

5.35

3.26

1.34

14.55

6.56

10.55

3.61

Vehicles and
Transport
Equipment

16.69

11.63

22.43

19.19

30.96

22.57

27.34

14.88

Various
instruments

6.96

5.03

7.23

5.14

15.19

6.78

14.37

5.93

B.

The GVC Participation Scenario

The last two decades have witnessed a sharp rise of trade flows in
intermediate products and parts and components, due to the growth of crosscountry GVCs. On the one hand, the deepening of the resulting international
production networks (IPNs) has been facilitated by cross-country contract
manufacturing arrangements.104 On the other hand, continued tariff reforms of
a wider variety of products have led to enhanced trade opportunities. The IPNs
often develop and deepen following a “hub-and-spoke” model, where the
global firms from the “center” enter into linkages with supplier networks
developed in the peripheries. The “success” of a country in the IPN can be
explained by several factors. First, a country characterized by demand-side
advantages (e.g., market size) can emerge as a major production and assembly
hub. Second, inherent supply-side advantages (e.g., lower labor cost, skilled
labor availability, resource-intensity) play a key role in determining location
choices of the developed countries’ multinational corporations (MNCs).
Third, an improved business climate (e.g., smoother FDI and tax norms) and
a trade facilitation scenario (i.e., rules of origin harmonization, better
connectivity with key markets, RTAs with wider set of countries) help
countries emerge as IPN hubs. 105 This was observed by the Global Value
104

The International Production Networks (IPNs) can be defined as spread of production blocks,
specializing in different stages of production, across countries. See generally Jayant Menon, Supporting the
Growth and Spread of International Production Networks in Asia: How Can Trade Policy Help? (Asian Dev.
Bank, Working Paper No. 112, 2013).
105
See generally JAVIER LÓPEZ-GONZÁLEZ & PRZEMYSLAW KOWALSKI, GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN
PARTICIPATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: TRADE AND RELATED POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13 (L. Y. Ing & F. Kimura
eds., 2017).
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Chain Development Report, noting that the US, Germany, China, and Japan
were among the major production hubs.106
The economic effects of participation in the IPNs are ambiguous. After
an initial tariff reform, either unilaterally or through RTAs, a country may
experience rising imports of intermediate inputs and parts and components, to
be used in the export segment. In that case, the foreign value-added content
(FVA) of exports may increase sharply, resulting in a possible long-term trade
deficit. Such negative repercussions on trade balance and, in turn, on
employment creation, might lead to a demand for the protection from the
lesser value-added segments in the domestic industry. Yet, if the inherent
advantages within a country strengthen the domestic production of
intermediate goods, the vibrant supplier network will facilitate the relocation
of foreign MNCs to a country with the objective of value chain integration
with domestic companies. In that case, total exports, as well as the domestic
value added to the (DVA) content of exports, would eventually increase and
result in a trade surplus and employment benefits. Such success may inspire
domestic lobbying groups to embrace further reform measures and motivate
governments to enter into newer RTAs. This improved economic standing
may also motivate the governments that benefit from an improved trade
balance to explore newer RTAs. 107 In other words, the realized gains, as
reflected through trade balance and labor market adjustments, can
significantly influence a country to make commitments at future multilateral
trade rounds.
The DVA content scenario for sectoral exports in any given time period
across key economies can be compared by using various versions of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Trade
in Value Added (TiVA) database.108 The latest TiVA data from December
2018 provides information on the export value-added by source, for sixty-four
economies, including all OECD and G20 countries, the European Union, and
a significant number of East Asian, Southeast Asian economies and emerging
nations from 2005 to 2015. By appropriately matching the country-level
input-output tables (which may be published with different periodicity and
industrial classifications), data on thirty-six aggregated sectors are provided
106

DAVID DOLLAR ET AL., GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019: TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION, SUPPLY CHAIN TRADE, AND WORKERS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 9 (David Dollar et al. 2019).
107
See generally Michael Sampson, The evolution of China’s regional trade agreements: power
dynamics and the future of the Asia-Pacific, 34 PAC. REV. 259, 259–289 (2021); Mitsuo Matsushita,
Regionalism and the Disciplines of the WTO: Analysis of Some Legal Aspects under Article XXIV of the
GATT, 13 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 191, 191–201 (2005).
108
See Rashmi Banga, Linking into Global Value Chains Is Not Sufficient: Do You Export Domestic
Value Added Contents?, 29 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 268, 268–297 (2014).
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in the OECD-TiVA database. The present analysis draws data from the 2018
TiVA database for six key manufacturing sectors, namely: textile, apparel,
and leather; chemicals and non-metallic mineral products; base metals;
computers, electrical machineries and electricals; machinery and equipment;
and transport equipment. 109 It may be noted that all of these sectors are
characterized by deeper participation within global IPNs.110 The DVA content
data is then compared for select countries between two periods, namely 2005–
2010, a period characterized by NAMA negotiations, and 2011–2015, a phase
when NAMA reforms moved backstage. The results are summarized in Tables
3–6.
For each of the four countries, the value-added in sectoral exports by
source country and group is reported in percentages, as computed from the
TiVA data on origin of value added in gross exports. The numbers are
interpreted in the following manner. For instance, regarding China during
2005–2010 and 2011–2015, as captured in Tables 3A and 3B respectively, the
DVA content (i.e., proportional value of domestic intermediate products) of
total exports in the textile, clothing, and leather categories was 85.54% and
88.20%, respectively. In other words, the DVA content has increased for
China in the latter period, as the country’s dependence on imported parts and
components in proportional terms declined. Conversely, the FVA content for
the same product from the European Union (28) declined from 2.05% to
1.71%, indicating China’s shrinking input dependence on the developed
country bloc.
The value-addition scenario for developed countries is summarized in
Tables 3A–3B and 4A–4B. First, in Tables 3A and 3B, it is observed that the
DVA content has decreased for the European Union (28) in all six product
categories, signifying rising penetration by foreign suppliers into its upstream
manufacturing value chains. Second, barring the exception of the computer,
electronics, and electrical equipment, the shares of Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)111 and North America has generally increased in the
109

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 2018
ed: Principle Indicators, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TIVA_2018_C1#.
110
See Pathikonda & Farole, supra note 90 at 2, 11–13.
111
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional intergovernmental organization
made up of ten member states. Established by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
in 1967, it later welcomed Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Vietnam
to its ranks. ASEAN is based on an extroverted growth model (openness to trade and FDI) and has solid
growth drivers (including a sizeable market, with 650 million inhabitants or nine percent of the world
population, and a young population, urban and connected). Bringing together very open economies, it
contributes around eight percent to world trade. The amount of inward foreign investment, at 149 billion
USD in 2018, is comparable to inward FDI in mainland China. ASEAN is also one of the regions in the world
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FVA content of European Union exports. Third, the FVA content from South
Korea, China, and India has increased, underlining the rising contribution
from relatively low-cost economies. The FVA content has also grown in
Brazil and Russia, which are both key emerging economies. Finally, the
declining shares of Japan further underline the importance of cost
considerations. The strengthening job market restrictions in several European
countries and its adverse influence on labor migration may be noted in this
context.112
The value-addition scenario for the United States has been summarized
in Tables 4A and 4B respectively, from which the following observations
emerge. First, barring the exception of computer, electronics, and electrical
equipment, for all other sectors, the DVA content has declined in the United
States. Second, the FVA content is generally declining from the European
Union (28) and Japan, countries that are relatively high-cost economies.
Finally, all the low-cost partners, namely China and India, have deepened
their participation in the United States’ value chains. However, a mixed trend
emerges for Brazil and Russia. The lower value-addition has left a mark in the
recent trade policy deliberations, as reflected in the “America First”
interventions. It has been observed over the last decade that several developed
countries have provided incentives to local companies, who had previously
relocated parts of their production and assembling facilities in a low-cost
economy (also called “offshoring”), to return home (“backshoring”).113 The
backshoring of manufacturing and assembling activities can create local
employment on one hand and enhance the domestic value addition in gross
exports on the other. Apart from the trade war with China, the United States
that is best integrated into global value chains (notably electronics, textiles, and automobiles). The level of
development of ASEAN countries today is very heterogeneous, with an average per capita income of around
$4,600, ranging from $1,200 for Burma to $65,000 for Singapore. According to the World Bank
classification, based on gross national income, the region has six “lower middle income countries” (Laos,
Cambodia, Burma, Vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia), two “upper middle income countries” (Thailand,
Malaysia) and two “high income countries” (Brunei, Singapore). See JULIEN CHAISSE & SUFIAN JUSOH, THE
ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT: THE REGIONALIZATION OF LAWS AND POLICY ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 265 (2016).
112
See Fredrik Erixon & Razeen Sally, Trade, Globalisation and Emerging Protectionism Since the
Crisis (European Centre for Int’l Pol. Econ., Working Paper No. 02, 2010).
113
It is a usual commercial practice of leading corporations to relocate some part of its production or
services operations in an overseas market, where the labor or raw material costs are cheaper vis-à-vis the
comparable figures in the home country. This phenomenon is known as offshoring. On the other hand, the
procedure of bringing the offshore production or services back in the home country of the corporation is
known as reshoring, onshoring, inshoring, or backshoring. See Lydia Bals, Anika Daum & Wendy Tate,
From Offshoring to Rightshoring: Focus on the Backshoring Phenomenon, 15 AIB INSIGHTS 3 (2015);
ALESSANDRO BARONCELLI, VALERIA BELVEDERE & LUIGI SERIO, OFFSHORING VERSUS RESHORING?
RATHER, SHOULDN’T IT BE RIGHTSHORING?, in RESHORING OF MANUFACTURING 39–56 (Alesessandra
Vecchi ed., 2017).
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has also imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum exports from the European
Union, to which the bloc has responded with proportionate retaliations.114 It
has also withdrawn the Generalized System of Preferences115 benefits from
Indian exports citing concerns, “including high tariffs on motorcycles and
telecommunication products, price control on medical devices such as
coronary stents and knee implant components, unfavorable treatment against
United States dairy products and unfair rules against e-commerce companies
and requirements for data localisation.” 116 In retaliation, India slapped
retaliatory tariffs on twenty-nine United States export products, but delayed
its execution in anticipation of a future trade agreement.117
The value-addition scenario for the developing countries is summarized
in Tables 5A–5B and 6A–6B. An interesting dynamic involving China
emerges from Tables 5A and 5B. First, the DVA content has increased for
China in all the product categories, signifying the evolving maturity of the
local manufacturing sector in intermediate segments. Second, the shares of
North America and Europe have generally decreased in China’s
114

Maria Demertzis & Gustav Fredriksson, The EU Response to US Trade Tariffs, INTERECONOMICS
260, 266 (2018), https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EU-Response-US-Trade-Tariffs.pdf.
115
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), instituted in 1971 under the aegis of United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “has contributed over the years to creating an enabling
trading environment for developing countries. The following fifteen countries grant GSP preferences:
Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
Challenges arise for beneficiaries in fully exploiting the market access opportunities available under these
schemes, including in effectively meeting the rules of origin requirements. Following the WTO Hong Kong
Ministerial Decision in 2005 in which members agreed that developed countries and developing countries in
a position to do so would grant duty-free and quota-free market access for exports of LDCs, improvements
were made to various GSP schemes and/or new schemes for LDCs were launched. Subsequent ministerial
decisions, including that taken at MC10 in Nairobi, in December of 2015, reaffirmed the continued
importance of this issue for LDCs’ trade and development prospects. The provision and utilization of trade
preferences is a key goal the Istanbul Program of Actions adopted at the UN LDC IV in 2013, as further
reaffirmed in SDGs Goal 17. The objective of UNCTAD’s support on GSP and other preferential
arrangements is to help developing countries—particularly LDCs—increase utilization of GSP and other
trade preferences and in turn promote productive capacity development and increased trade. Such support
includes raising awareness and enhancing understanding among exporters and government officials in
beneficiary countries of the trading opportunities available under the schemes; strengthening understanding
of technical and administrative regulations and laws governing preferential market access, particularly rules
of origin; and disseminating relevant information for users of GSP and other preferential schemes. Support
is also provided to providers of preferences in improving their preferential schemes.” Generalized System o
f Preferences, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/topic/trae-agreements/generalized-system-of-preferences (last
visited Oct. 24, 2021). See also Anupa Sharma, Jason Grant & Kathryn Boys, Truly Preferential Treatment?
Reconsidering the Generalised System of (Trade) Preferences with Competing Suppliers,72 J. AGRIC. ECON.
500, 500–524 (2020).
116
R. Rajesh Babu, On the Legality of the United States Action of Terminating India’s GSP Status, 55
FOREIGN TRADE REV. 119, 120 (2020).
117
Asit Ranjan Mishra, As US Delays Withdrawing GSP Benefits, India Postpones Retaliatory Tariffs,
MINT (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.livemint.com/politics/policy/as-us-delays-withdrawing-gsp-benefitsindia-postpones-retaliatory-tariffs-1556766723738.html.
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manufacturing value chains, signifying the displacement of these actors.
Third, even the shares of RTA partners (ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea)
have declined in the FVA content, barring a minor exception involving
ASEAN, specifically regarding base metals. Fourth, the FVA from India is
increasing in the textile, apparel, and leather sector, signifying its import
dependence in relatively low-value products. Finally, in an interesting
observation, the FVA content from Brazil has increased Chinese exports.
While the inherent competitiveness has aided the Chinese performance, the
underlying role played by fiscal and financial stimulus to the Chinese
exporters is noteworthy.118 One of the drivers behind the launch of the “Made
in China 2025” initiative has been the urge to consolidate its advantages in
high-tech manufacturing. While this move would enable China to emerge as
the dominant global player in this segment, the possible threats to other
countries’ exports is noteworthy.119
Tables 6A and 6B summarize the value-addition set-up for India. First,
the average DVA has increased in only two sectors: textile, apparel and
leather, and chemicals and non-metallic mineral products. This indicates a
growing industrial consolidation in low-to-mid tech product segments.
Second, the value-content from Europe has declined in all categories,
signifying the displacement of high-cost suppliers from India GVCs. Third,
shares from the United States have declined only in textile, apparel, leather,
chemicals, and non-metallic mineral products. This indicates the deepening of
Indian participation in United States GVCs, in relatively high-tech product
groups. Fourth, the FVA from ASEAN and South Korea, also known as the
RTA partners, has generally increased for all product groups. Fifth, there has
been a general decline in the FVA content in Indian exports from Brazil and
Russia, its emerging country partners. Finally, the FVA has generally
increased from China and South Korea, countries which enjoy an economyof-scale advantage. The value-addition dynamics from the “East,” particularly
China, have recently shaped India’s cautious steps and eventually the RCEP
pull-out decision.120 The trade deficits in key manufacturing segments had

118

Erixon & Sally, supra note 112. See also Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty & Biswajit Nag,
The Three-pronged Strategy of India’s Preferential Trade Policy: A Contribution to the Study of Modern
Economic Treaties, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 415, 454 (2011).
119
Jost Wübbeke et al., Made in China 2025: The Making of a High-tech Superpower and its
Implications for Industrial Countries, 2 MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA STUDIES 1 (2016). See Julien Chaisse
& Luan Xinjie, Why Will China Establish a Government-Sponsored Response Mechanism in Countervailing
Games? 10 J. WORLD INV. TRADE 227 (2009).
120
See Biswajit Dhar, India’s Withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,
54 ECON. AND POL. WKLY. 64 (2019).
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emerged as a particular concern for India.121 The country has subsequently
launched the 2014 “Make-in-India” initiative to revitalize and consolidate a
wide range of domestic manufacturing sectors.122
The economic explanation of the observed DVA trend is as follows.
Since the 1990s, the following two decades witnessed a shift from the
developed country value chains to the production blocks located in developing
countries (e.g., China or Mexico). The relocation of the leading MNCs from
developed countries to developing countries can be explained by these
corporations’ urge to take advantage of the lower costs in these locations (e.g.,
labor cost and raw material cost).123 Subsequently, however, a reversing trend
has emerged in the European Union and the United States, which can be
explained both by growing economic nationalism 124 and narrowing cost
advantages.125 India has experienced a degree of domestic consolidation in the
low-to-mid segment in recent times, but remains dependent on foreign parts
and components in the more technology-intensive categories.126 China on the
other hand, has considerably strengthened its input tier in the entire
manufacturing sector.127
The diverging success patterns in the GVC participation of the four
selected countries can also be partially explained by their regional trade
policies. The European Union’s trade policy towards its neighboring countries
is covered under the general framework of the European Union’s RTAs, as
well as the European Union Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 128 There are
121

See generally Sudip Chaudhuri, Manufacturing Trade Deficit and Industrial Policy in India, 48
ECON. AND POL. WKLY. 42–44 (2013).
122
See GOV’T OF INDIA, Made in India, https://www.makeinindia.com/sectors (detailing sector wise
policy environment under current scheme).
123
DOLLAR ET AL., supra note 106.
124
Daniel C. K. Chow, Ian M. Sheldon & William McGuire, The Revival of Economic Nationalism
and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2019); Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Troubling Rise
of Economic Nationalism in the European Union, PETERSON INST. INT’L. ECON. (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/troubling-rise-economic-nationalismeuropean-union. See also Julien Chaisse, Georgios Dimitropoulos, Special Economic Zones in International
Economic Law: Towards Unilateral Economic Law, 24 J. OF INT’L. ECON. L. 229 (2021) (discussing four
types of unilateralism in State practice: “classical unilateralism, embedded unilateralism, sustainability
unilateralism, and national security unilateralism”).
125
John A. Pearce II, Why domestic outsourcing is leading America’s reemergence in global
manufacturing, 57 BUS. HORIZONS 27, 29 (2014).
126
See generally Isabelle Joumard et al., Challenges and Opportunities of India’s Enhanced
Participation in the Global Economy (Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Working Paper No. 1597, 2020).
127
See generally Chunjiao Yu & Zhechong Luo, What are China’s real gains within global value
chains? Measuring domestic value added in China’s exports of manufactures, 47 CHINA ECON. REV. 263,
264 (2018).
128
Sevil Acar & Mahmut Tekçe, Multilateralism or Bilateralism: Trade Policy of the EU in the Age of
Free Trade Agreements, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON EMERGING ECONOMIC ISSUES IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 272, 273 (Oguz Esen & Ayla Ogus eds., 2008).
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currently twenty-four RTAs in the European community, another eight signed
but not yet in force, and eleven under negotiation. Most of these treaties are
with various countries’ regional organizations. Additionally, the number of
countries covered by European Union-centric RTAs is now substantial and is
expected to increase. The RTAs vary in scope and coverage; they also vary to
the extent the trade laws are inserted into other non-trade provisions. While
there are comparatively few substantive service obligations currently
included, a range of projected deals is still under discussion. These will
include services and the expansion of certain existing RTA services
agreements. A section of the literature notes that Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) inflows lead to a decline in demand for domestic inputs and
consequently lowers the DVA content in exports for both old and new
European Union members. 129 Moreover, since 2016, rising labor costs are
another major challenge for the bloc.130
One the one hand, the United States has witnessed a sharp decline in
the manufacturing sector. Specifically, “90% of the manufacturing that lies
outside the computer and electronics industry has seen its real GDP fall
substantially.” At the same time, its productivity growth has been slow,
leading to relatively modest employment growth.131 While the country made
significant tariff reforms through RTAs since the 1990s (e.g., NAFTA),
discussions during recent renegotiations indicate a growing protectionist
intent. 132 While the United States’ integration with Canada through
bidirectional IPNs 133 continues, its participation in the IPNs of several other
countries is waning.134
On the other hand, the experiences of China and India, the two
developing countries considered in this analysis, have been mixed. A
considerable amount of FDI inflows in China, predating its WTO
membership, developed its production base and sharpened its domestic
129

See Nataša Vrh, What Drives the Differences in Domestic Value Added in Exports Between Old and
New E.U. Member States, 31 ECON. RSCH. 645, 645–57(2018).
130
European Commission Press Release 143/2018, Eurostat, Annual Growth in Labor Costs at 2.6% in
Euro Area (Sept. 14, 2018).
131
Martin Neil Baily & Barry P. Bosworth, US Manufacturing: Understanding Its Past and Its
Potential Future, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2014).
132
Robert A. Blecker et al., Trumping the NAFTA Renegotiation: An Alternative Policy Framework
for Mexican-United States Cooperation and Economic Convergence, 1 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 94, 96–99
(2017). See also Matsushita, supra note 107.
133
International Production Network (IPN) / Global Production Network (GPN) refers to the process
of deep-rooted international linkages among firms through interconnected nodes, which integrates the players
located in different production blocs placed across different countries. For a detailed discussion on IPN/GPN,
see Neil M. Coe & Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Global Production Networks: Mapping Recent Conceptual
Developments, 19 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 775, 775–801 (2019).
134
DOLLAR ET AL., supra note 106.
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competitiveness and export capabilities.135 Over the years, China played an
aggressive RTA strategy by entering into trade agreements with several
partners in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.136 The opportunity
to access a wider market enabled the Chinese firms to enjoy scale economies
with low-cost advantage, 137 allowing the country to opt for deeper tariff
reforms. This deep RTA participation strategy contributed significantly to the
long-term enhancement of the DVA content of Chinese exports.138
Conversely, the manufacturing productivity growth in India has been
slower compared to other Asian economies. This is due to distortions in the
form of restrictive regulations on entry, expansion, labor-related provisions,
and exit options.139 While the country has significantly improved the ease of
doing business in recent times,140 the readiness towards the use, adoption, and
adaptation of frontier technologies in India has remained modest compared to
the corresponding figures in China and other Asian neighbors 141 , which
influence the pace of technology transfer to the country. In the last ten years,
the country has opened up through a number of RTAs with partners located
in East, Southeast, and South Asia, but has only witnessed a moderate
presence in Asian IPNs to date.142 The country’s recent reluctance to commit
to the expansion of the Information Technology Agreement products (ITA-2),
in light of the modest performance of the ITA-1 products, is also notable.143
While the tariff reforms initially led to a fall in DVA content,144 a rise in more
recent periods reflects a certain degree of domestic consolidation after the
launch of the “Make-in-India” scheme. However, the worries on the

135
See Wanda Tseng & Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons for Other
Countries (Int’l Monetary Fund, Policy Discussion Paper No. 02/3, 2002).
136
Henry S. Gao, China's Strategy for Free Trade Agreements: Political Battle in the Name of Trade,
in EAST ASIAN ECON. INTEGRATION 104, 104–20 (Ross p. Buckley et al. eds., 2011).
137
Pravakar Sahoo & Abhirup Bhunia, China's Manufacturing Success: Lessons for India (Inst. of
Econ. Growth, Working Paper No. 344, 2014).
138
Jie Zhang et al., Measuring the Domestic Value Added in China’s Exports and the Mechanism of
Change, 4 ECON. RSCH. J. 124, 124–137 (2013).
139
Sean M. Dougherty et al., What is Holding Back Productivity Growth in India? Recent
Microevidence, 2009 OECD J. ECON. STUD. 1, 14 (2009).
140
Ease of Doing Business, MAKE IN INDIA (last visited Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.makeindia.com/
eodb.
141
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2021
(2021).
142
See Biswajit Nag, Trade, Investment and Economic Development in Asia: Empirical and Policy
Issues, in TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA: EMPIRICAL AND POLICY ISSUES 49,
52 (Debashis Chakraborty & Jaydeep Mukherjee eds., 2016).
143
Rashmi Banga, Implications of Signing Information Technology Agreement (ITA-1) and Expansion
of ITA (ITA-2) (Ctr. For WTO Stud. Indian Inst. of Foreign Trade, Working Paper No. CWS/200/57, 2020).
144
C. Veeramani & Garima Dhir, Domestic Value Added Content of India's Exports: Estimates for 112
Sectors, 1999-2000 to 2012-13 (Indira Gandhi Inst. of Dev. Rsch. Working Paper No. 008, 2017).
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employment front continues in India,145 along with the growing trade deficits
across several sectors. Given this scenario in the domestic market and the
outlook towards reforms through RTAs,146 it is unlikely that India will be
proactive in embracing tariff reforms in the future.
Table 3A: European Union (28)’s Production Integration in GVCs—
Contribution of Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2005–2010)147
Exporting Country: European Union
Source
Country
for VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

89.76

87.34

88.84

93.38

90.33

93.19

Japan

0.42

0.53

0.52

0.91

1.49

1.28

South Korea 0.22

0.15

0.20

0.30

0.93

0.56

United
States

1.16

2.65

2.02

2.00

3.29

3.27

Brazil

0.30

0.23

0.84

0.31

0.27

0.33

China

2.13

0.61

0.96

1.36

3.00

1.37

India

0.71

0.25

0.26

0.24

0.25

0.27

Russia

0.69

2.75

2.16

1.08

0.94

0.93

ASEAN

0.66

0.49

0.54

0.46

1.16

0.55

Eastern Asia 2.98

1.44

1.85

2.83

6.24

3.47

EU (15)

81.37

76.58

76.59

83.71

75.95

79.36

EU (28)

88.24

81.30

83.20

88.12

83.05

86.31

EU (13)

6.87

4.72

6.61

4.41

7.10

6.95

145
See K. P. Kannan & G. Raveendran, From Jobless to Job-loss Growth: Gainers and Losers during
2012–18, 54 ECON. & POL’Y. WKLY. 38 (2019).
146
See Ila Patnaik & Radhika Pandey, RCEP would’ve led to flood of imports into India. Reform is a
better way to boost exports, THEPRINT (Nov. 20, 2020), https://theprint.in/ilanomics/rcep-wouldve-led-toflood-of-imports-into-india-reform-is-a-better-way-to-boost-exports/548051/.
147
Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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North
America

1.34

3.13

3.00

2.41

3.73

3.82

Europe

89.69

86.70

86.85

90.56

85.26

88.40

Table 3B: European Union (28)’s Production Integration in GVCs—
Contribution of Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2011–2015)148
Exporting Country: European Union
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

87.28

84.07

87.20

91.94

88.76

91.58

Japan

0.32

0.48

0.45

0.76

0.99

0.99

South Korea 0.23

0.19

0.23

0.32

0.77

0.61

United
States

1.21

3.20

2.38

2.09

2.93

3.40

Brazil

0.30

0.28

1.15

0.36

0.30

0.34

China

3.31

0.99

1.39

2.13

4.11

2.15

India

0.79

0.35

0.33

0.33

0.32

0.39

Russia

0.96

3.73

2.23

1.08

0.98

1.01

ASEAN

0.76

0.61

0.54

0.55

1.10

0.66

Eastern Asia 4.01

1.80

2.26

3.46

6.45

4.01

EU (15)

78.83

72.17

74.11

81.45

74.10

76.54

EU (28)

86.34

77.46

81.48

86.98

82.68

85.00

EU (13)

7.51

5.29

7.37

5.53

8.59

8.45

North
America

1.42

3.76

3.44

2.51

3.41

3.95

Europe

87.99

83.87

85.24

89.42

85.04

87.17

148

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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Table 4A: United States’ Production Integration in GVCs—Contribution
of Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2005–2010)149
Exporting Country: United States
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

91.98

88.57

92.50

93.54

94.53

93.92

Japan

0.75

0.63

0.90

2.12

1.13

2.88

South Korea 0.39

0.20

0.34

0.56

0.53

0.74

United
States

85.33

78.93

82.25

81.61

87.69

80.37

Brazil

0.30

0.39

0.53

0.41

0.20

0.40

China

3.54

0.76

1.52

2.48

2.31

2.29

India

0.78

0.18

0.25

0.26

0.14

0.25

Russia

0.21

0.40

0.69

0.41

0.26

0.34

ASEAN

0.68

0.40

0.39

0.56

0.76

0.58

Eastern Asia 5.01

1.73

3.02

5.56

4.46

6.30

EU (15)

2.86

2.70

3.04

4.26

2.14

4.56

EU (28)

2.99

2.81

3.20

4.49

2.26

4.80

EU (13)

0.13

0.10

0.16

0.23

0.12

0.24

North
America

87.23

84.36

86.94

85.44

89.99

84.71

Europe

3.39

3.52

4.16

5.22

2.73

5.41

149

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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Table 4B: United States’ Production Integration in GVCs—Contribution
of Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2011–2015)150
Exporting Country: United States
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

89.57

87.97

92.04

91.82

94.45

92.09

Japan

0.60

0.44

0.81

1.79

0.68

2.09

South Korea 0.39

0.19

0.48

0.73

0.45

0.88

United
States

83.42

78.15

81.86

80.09

88.91

79.52

Brazil

0.24

0.45

0.61

0.43

0.18

0.43

China

5.53

1.06

2.20

3.96

2.93

3.73

India

1.09

0.22

0.31

0.34

0.15

0.34

Russia

0.23

0.39

0.61

0.38

0.19

0.36

ASEAN

0.85

0.41

0.48

0.70

0.61

0.74

Eastern Asia 6.80

1.81

3.76

6.89

4.42

7.11

EU (15)

2.51

1.95

2.87

4.05

1.65

4.25

EU (28)

2.65

2.05

3.06

4.34

1.77

4.55

EU (13)

0.14

0.10

0.19

0.29

0.12

0.30

North
America

85.29

84.82

86.54

83.93

90.96

83.67

Europe

3.07

2.69

3.92

5.07

2.17

5.21

150

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).

40

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 1

Table 5A: China’s Production Integration in GVCs—Contribution of
Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2005–2010)151
Exporting Country: United States
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

7.74

9.79

12.10

13.61

21.57

14.00

Japan

2.10

2.44

2.26

3.51

6.20

3.49

South Korea 1.40

1.53

1.13

1.65

4.83

1.62

United
States

1.32

1.85

1.42

1.93

3.64

2.47

Brazil

0.28

0.32

1.06

0.51

0.32

0.43

China

85.54

78.12

77.07

77.95

64.46

78.40

India

0.29

0.33

0.83

0.43

0.34

0.35

Russia

0.40

0.87

0.78

0.65

0.54

0.60

ASEAN

1.22

1.70

1.42

1.49

4.24

1.37

Eastern Asia 90.52

83.44

81.41

84.60

80.55

84.84

EU (15)

1.97

2.38

2.30

3.55

4.11

4.05

EU (28)

2.05

2.49

2.43

3.72

4.33

4.27

EU (13)

0.09

0.11

0.13

0.18

0.21

0.22

North
America

1.54

2.24

2.07

2.41

4.20

2.91

Europe

2.58

3.56

3.37

4.65

5.30

5.10

151

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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Table 5B: China’s Production Integration in GVCs—Contribution of
Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2011–2015)152
Exporting Country: United States
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
members

5.53

7.64

10.63

10.86

16.83

11.66

Japan

1.01

1.39

1.21

1.99

3.48

1.92

South Korea 0.83

1.10

0.75

1.31

4.20

1.20

United
States

1.13

1.60

1.37

1.72

2.80

2.52

Brazil

0.34

0.40

1.23

0.60

0.40

0.49

China

88.20

80.50

78.60

80.90

70.33

81.10

India

0.47

0.26

0.30

0.26

0.28

0.25

Russia

0.36

0.91

0.77

0.58

0.53

0.53

ASEAN

1.18

1.55

1.47

1.48

3.73

1.32

Eastern Asia 90.73

83.69

81.03

85.16

81.90

85.02

EU (15)

1.62

1.96

1.73

2.64

3.33

3.48

EU (28)

1.71

2.08

1.88

2.83

3.57

3.74

EU (13)

0.09

0.12

0.14

0.19

0.24

0.26

North
America

1.33

1.93

2.02

2.19

3.33

2.98

Europe

2.19

3.17

2.81

3.67

4.61

4.49

152

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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Table 6A: India’s Production Integration in GVCs—Contribution of
Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2005–2010)153
Exporting Country: United States
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

6.38

8.09

17.71

15.47

19.75

15.66

Japan

0.56

0.58

0.92

0.98

1.41

1.22

South Korea 0.40

0.43

0.71

0.78

1.25

0.95

United
States

1.47

1.80

2.25

2.34

3.37

2.99

Brazil

0.13

0.39

0.45

0.31

0.31

0.29

China

2.32

1.87

2.50

2.66

4.48

2.77

India

82.19

55.91

63.40

70.44

62.45

70.37

Russia

0.50

0.75

1.31

1.18

1.21

1.03

ASEAN

1.33

2.10

3.01

1.84

2.69

1.90

Eastern Asia 3.72

3.16

4.51

4.84

7.95

5.40

EU (15)

2.54

2.81

4.69

4.63

5.62

5.31

EU (28)

2.69

3.01

4.96

4.89

5.92

5.62

EU (13)

0.15

0.20

0.27

0.27

0.30

0.31

North
America

1.72

2.34

2.96

2.92

4.05

3.54

Europe

3.45

4.11

6.90

6.76

8.04

7.29

153

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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Table 6B: India’s Production Integration in GVCs—Contribution of
Value Added by Source in Exports (%) (2011–2015)154
Exporting Country: United States
Source
Country for
VA (%)

Textile,
Apparel,
and
Leather

Chemicals
and nonmetallic
mineral
products

Basic
Computer,
Metal and Machinery Electronics
Transport
Fabricated
and
and
Equipment
Metal
Equipment Electrical
Products
Equipment

OECD
Members

5.17

7.48

16.49

15.95

19.83

14.15

Japan

0.43

0.53

0.91

0.98

1.14

1.12

South Korea 0.44

0.51

0.81

0.92

1.18

1.02

United
States

1.18

1.65

3.01

3.61

4.91

3.07

Brazil

0.15

0.42

0.68

0.52

0.60

0.45

China

3.10

2.38

2.89

3.40

5.14

3.69

India

82.49

58.35

63.13

67.20

59.98

69.33

Russia

0.35

0.58

1.14

1.16

1.45

0.94

ASEAN

1.35

2.16

3.75

2.64

2.73

2.25

Eastern Asia 4.28

3.71

4.94

5.69

8.08

6.27

EU (15)

1.98

2.61

3.79

4.31

5.42

4.55

EU (28)

2.11

2.80

4.02

4.56

5.72

4.82

EU (13)

0.13

0.19

0.23

0.25

0.30

0.27

North
America

1.40

2.31

3.94

4.40

5.91

3.71

Europe

2.68

3.69

5.66

6.33

8.02

6.32

C.

Contingency Scenarios

As observed in Tables 1 and 2, the European Union, the United States,
China, and India have all reduced their tariff barriers over the last two decades.
154

Constructed by authors from OECD TiVA data (OECD, 2018).
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However, a rising trend has appeared in the last couple of years. The evidence
from existing literature shows that, with the decline in tariff barriers, a
simultaneous demand for contingency protection usually rises from the
domestic manufacturing industries. 155 Anti-dumping investigation in a
country can be triggered by a multitude of factors. On the one hand, a rise in
import flows, a dwindling income level, and a financial crisis can intensify
protectionist demands from the domestic industry.156 On the other hand, the
contingency actions are usually higher in capital-intensive sectors, 157 as
garnering support (i.e., ensuring that complaining firms collectively account
for more than 50% of the domestic production) for the investigation is easier.
There is also a need to see which sectors witness higher incidence of
contingency interventions in the European Union, the United States, China,
and India and its interlinkage with the tariff reform process. When the
European Union and the United States were regular users of the contingency
provisions, beginning at the inception of the WTO, China, and India were
among the targeted exporters. 158 However, in recent periods, these two
countries have “learnt” from their past experiences and emerged as major
users of the contingency provisions.159
As noted in Table 1, the European Union imposed higher WAT for a
wide range of commodities from 2011 to 2018, namely organic chemical,
plastic and rubber, leather and footwear, garments, iron and steel, machinery
and equipment, electrical equipment, vehicles and transport equipment and
instrumentations. The corresponding sectors for the United States included
155
Chad P. Bown & Patricia Tovar, Trade Liberalization, Antidumping, and Safeguards: Evidence
from India’s Tariff Reform, 96 J. DEV. OF ECON. 115, 115–116 (2011). See also Luisa Kinzius, et al., Trade
Protection and the Role of Non-Tariff Barriers, 155 REV. WORLD ECON. 603, 604 (2019),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-019-00341-6; see Yuhe Wang, et al., Total Factor Productivity Growth and
its Contribution: Lessons from the Chinese Construction Industry Pre- and Post-2008 Financial Crisis, 27
ENG’G, CONSTR. & ARCHITECTURAL MGMT. 2911, 2925 (2020); Zhaohui Niu, et al., Non-tariff and Overall
Protection: Evidence Across Countries and Over Time 154 REV. WORLD ECON. 675, 697 (2018).
156
See Rou Li, The Research on Factors Which Affect Anti-Dumping Investigation: Based on Probit
Model, 13 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 252, 252 (2018).
157
The relationship between capital-intensity of a sector and anti-dumping activism therein started
emerging in India two decades ago. See Aradhna Aggarwal, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: An Indian
Perspective 31 (ICRIER, Working Paper No. 85, 2002).
158
In the initial years after WTO inception, India was primarily a complainant at the WTO
dispute settlement forum on Anti-Dumping investigations. Yet a decade later, India gradually emerged as a
respondent in the same. See generally Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules
Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement
System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2007). See also Debashis Chakraborty & Dipankar Sengupta,
Learning through Trading? India’s Decade Long Experience at WTO, 12 SOUTH ASIAN SURV. 236 (2005).
The trend becomes clearer in the subsequent period, as observed from, Debashis Chakraborty & Julien
Chaisse, Tightrope Walk Between Faith and Skepticism: India’s ‘Contingency Plan’ for Free Trade, 15
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 91, 150 (2020).
159
Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 4 (2012).
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organic chemical, rubber, leather and footwear, garments, and iron and steel.
Table 2 indicates that China harbors a protectionist intent towards copper
products, vehicles and transport equipment and instrument sectors. In India,
similar protection has been extended only to pharmaceuticals, rubber, leather,
and footwear segments. In the following analysis, this article links the tariff
dynamics in these economies with their AD and SCM activisms, by obtaining
the data from the corresponding WTO databases. 160 The results are
summarized in Table 7.
It is noted from Table 7 that the European Union has primarily
intervened in each sector receiving tariff protection through the AD route,
namely: chemical products (Section VI), plastic and rubber (Section VII),
base metal (Section XV) and machinery and equipment (Section XVI).
Comparatively, SCM measures have been used against plastic and rubber
products (Section VII) and base metal (Section XV) imports. In the United
States, all the sectors receiving protection through the tariff policy (i.e., higher
WAT) have been subjected to contingency interventions as well. The SCM
interventions have been more pronounced in case of base metal (Section XV)
imports. On the other hand, China happens to be a heavy user of AD for
chemical products (Section VI) and plastic and rubber products (Section VII).
It has also been involved in SCM activism for chemical products. In July
2020, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) noted that non-market
conditions exist in the United States’ energy and petrochemical sector.161 This
can be considered a strategic response to the continued use of the NME
provision by the United States against China. Finally, in India, the
commonality between the protectionist intent by the tariff scale and its
observed AD interventions by sectors (Sections VI, VII, XV, XVI) are
evident. In particular, India has predominantly imposed the AD duties on
intermediate products, which correspond to its interest in protecting low-value
labor-intensive segments. 162 The primary target of India’s AD actions has
been the Chinese firms, who are exporting these low-to-mid tech intermediate
products (falling under Sections VI, VII, XV, XVI).163
160

Anti-Dumping, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm;
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm.
161
Zhiguo Yu & Sandeep Thomas Chandy, The US is now a “Non-Market Economy”—Anti-Dumping
Ruling by China, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (July 18, 2020), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2020/07/
the-us-is-now-a-non-market-economy-anti-dumping-ruling-by-china.html.
162
See Surojit Gupta & Sidhartha, Hardly any finished goods incur anti-dumping duties, THE TIMES
OF INDIA (Jan. 18, 2021), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/hardly-any-finishedgoods-incur-anti-dumping-duties/articleshow/80320715.cms.
163
See Debashis Chakraborty & Julien Chaisse, Tightrope Walk Between Faith and Skepticism: India’s
‘Contingency Plan’ for Free Trade, 15 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 91, 150 (2020).
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Table 7 also sheds light on an interesting phenomenon. The WITS data
indicates that the countries over the last two and half decades have increased
the number of duty-free lines across product categories, which has lowered
the average sectoral tariffs and signified reforms. However, the higher WAT
vis-à-vis the corresponding SAT figures in several country-product
combinations reveals that actual imports in a substantial range of lower duty
tariff lines remain relatively low, possibly because of certain NTBs. 164
Currently, the deeper contingency interventions in these sectors, considered
to be “reformed” on the tariff scale, underline the potential threat to the WTO
reform process for the following reason. While these tariff lines characterized
by lower duties indicate lesser protection in terms of direct import duties, they
might still receive the “compensating” protectionist cover through AD/SCM
measures. In this framework, assessing the process of “tariff reset” without
adequately addressing the possible misuse of contingency instruments would
be analogous to measuring the size of an iceberg by its tip.
Adverse trade outcomes in the aftermath of tariff reforms, such as
growing trade deficits, can lead to readjustments in domestic industries, which
would in turn adversely influence the labor markets. The political economic
currents associated with decline in domestic output level and growing
unemployment can lead to build-up of protectionist pressures, which are
reflected in recourse to contingency measures. 165 In Table 8, this article
presents a synthesis of trade remedy instruments and trade balance scenarios
for the European Union, the United States, China, and India to understand the
influence of trade outcomes on policy measures. For this purpose, the average
AD/SCM initiations and measures are matched over five periods since WTO
inception, namely: 1995–2000, 2001–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, and
2016–2019, with a corresponding trade deficit scenario for each. Among the
developed regions, the European Union has not faced many AD or SCM cases
as an exporter, though it has frequently adopted such policies on its imports
since 1995. However, as an importer, European Union activism has reduced
since 2000. In fact, the European Union’s trade deficit sharply declined
between 2006 and 2010, a period over which AD/SCM activism declined at a
slower rate. Subsequent improvement in trade balance has facilitated lower
adoption rates of these contingency instruments.
In contrast, the United States’ trade deficit has consistently worsened
since 1995. As a policy response, the recourse to AD/SCM measures since
2011–2019 has increased sharply, which can be attributed to the growing
164

Foletti et al., supra note 2, at 248–64.
Mustapha Sadni Jallab, The Political Influence of European and American Antidumping Decisions:
Some Empirical Evidence, 6 ECON. BULL. 1, 2–5 (2007).
165
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reach of the defensive interests.166 The United States AD actions on Chinese
exports deserve mention in this context. 167 Moreover, United States trade
disputes with India on the SCM front has shown interesting movements in
recent years.
In China, though exports have increasingly been subjected to SCM
activism since 2001, the imposition of AD measures have come down post2011. This reflects the success of its RTA policy, as China received a
commitment from all its preferential trade agreement partners168 in return for
extended market access not to consider it as NME in future trade discords.169
The incidence of AD measures on Chinese exports declined further from 2016
onwards, given the change in its WTO sanctioned status as a market economy.
The trade remedy measures on its exports, however, did not dampen the rise
in China’s trade surplus over the years. Additionally, China has increased both
AD and SCM initiations on imports, which have been attributed to the
emergence of protectionist orientations. It has been noted that the rise in such
contingency activism in China is non-retaliatory in nature. Specifically, this
activism is not initiated against a particular partner to “echo” the AD
protectionism launched against Chinese exports in their territory. 170
Nonetheless, it poses a concern for the partner countries, as China's legal
system has been criticized for its lack of transparency and procedural
fairness.171
166

Prashant Desai & Robert M. Feinberg, Are US Anti-dumping Cases Being Crowded Out by Other
Forms of Protectionism? 19 J. INT’L TRADE L. POL’Y 1, 3 (2020). See also Nancy Williams, The Resilience
of Protectionism in U.S. Trade Policy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 683 (2019).
167
Minsoo Lee, Donghyun Park & Aibo Cui, Invisible Trade Barriers: Trade Effects of US
Antidumping Actions against the People’s Republic of China, 1–21 (ADB Econ. Working Paper No. 378,
2013) (explaining that United States enterprises will continue to frequently use antidumping laws to reduce
the fierce import competition from the PRC’s exporters). In fact, other countries benefit from the antidumping
actions of the United States against the PRC. Most of the protective effects of antidumping measures are
offset by the increased imports from the countries other than the PRC. Overall, the impact of antidumping
measures is insignificant on the total imports to the United States. However, the antidumping measures do
achieve some purpose: they effectively increase the prices of the products concerned, especially prices of
imports from the PRC.
168
See Fee Trade Agreements, ASIA REGIONAL INTEGRATION CENTER, https://aric.adb.org/fta-country.
As per the Asian Development Bank’s Asia Regional Integration Centre (ADB-ARIC) database, China has
participated in a total of 47 free trade agreements (including the operational and ongoing arrangements). The
concluded trade agreements are spread across continents.
169
YANLIN SUN & JOHN WHALLEY, CHINA’S ANTI-DUMPING PROBLEMS AND MITIGATION THROUGH
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, CIGI PAPERS NO. 70 (2015).
170
Wu, supra note 159, at 39.
171
Adam Soliman, China's Anti-Dumping Regime and Compliance with Anti-Dumping Principles: An
Analysis Using Agricultural Dumping Case Studies, 21 UNIV. MIA. INT’L COMPAR. L. REV. 241, 263 (2014).
See also Ma, Jingyuan and Sokol, D. Daniel, Procedural Fairness in Chinese Antitrust, in ANTITRUST PROC.
FAIRNESS (D. Daniel Sokol & Andrew T. Guzman eds., forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270296;
Julien Chaisse, Deconstructing the WTO conformity obligation: A theory of compliance as a process, 38
FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 57 (2015).
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In line with the United States, the trade deficit has worsened for India,
with serious consequences for its manufacturing sector.172 Also, like China,
India experienced a decline in AD measures on its exports between 2007 to
2012, and the series registered an upward movement afterwards. The SCM
measures on the other hand had risen during 2014, 2016, and 2017.173 On the
whole, there has been a sharp increase in the adoption of both AD and SCM
measures on its imports since 2016, a period when India’s trade deficit also
widened. The sectors seeking AD protection in India have also generally
experienced the negative effects of trade liberalization, and the frequent use
of the contingency measures on imports is directed to lower the competitive
edge of the foreign players.174 Moreover, the anti-dumping investigation in
India is found to be susceptible to retaliatory intent and industry lobbying.175
In light of these evolving dynamics, the Indian AD provisions need to be less
ambiguous and in line with global practices. 176 On the other hand, the
increasing use of SCM measures against Indian exports is a function of the
evolving export facilitation-related policy frameworks.177
When joining the WTO, many developing countries were largely
underprepared to fathom its legal architecture and fully preempt the potential
challenges.178 As a result, they have often faced market access challenges in
terms of contingency measures imposed on their exports in the initial days of
WTO membership. 179 Subsequently, leading developing countries, wiser
from their past experiences, took recourse to the contingency measures
themselves.180 Table 8 reflects an interesting example of this type of “learning
by suffering” model, as represented by India and China. These two economies
have reformed their import tariffs since 2001, but simultaneously faced a high
incidence of AD and SCM measures on their exports. The rise in AD activism
172

Sudip Chaudhuri, Import Liberalization and Premature Deindustrialization in India, 50 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 60, 60 (2015).
173
Chakraborty & Chaisse, Tightrope Walk Between Faith and Skepticism, supra note 158, at 104–
105.
174
See Wu, supra note 159, at 38.
175
Sagnik Bagchi, Surajit Bhattacharyya, & K. Narayanan, Anti-dumping Initiations in Indian
Manufacturing Industries, 16 SOUTH ASIA ECON. J. 278, 281 (2015).
176
See Bhumika Billa, Strategising Protectionism: An Analysis of India’s Regulation of Anti-Dumping
Duty Circumvention, 10 TRADE, L. DEV. 417, 431 (2018).
177
See Parthapratim Pal & Arpita Mukherjee, Special Economic Zones Face the WTO Test, 53 ECON.
& POL. WKLY. 20, 20–1 (2018).
178
See Gregory Shaffer, The challenges of WTO law: strategies for developing country adaptation, 5
WORLD TRADE REV. 177, 182 (2006).
179
P.K.M. Tharakan, The Problem of Anti-Dumping Protection and Developing Country Exports 6–7
(United Nations Univ., WIDER Working Paper No. 198, 2000).
180
See generally Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Normative Obsolescence of WTO AntiDumping Agreement—Topography of the Global Use and Misuse of Anti-Dumping Measures, 6 ASIAN J.
INT’L L. 223 (2016).
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witnessed in these two countries since 2016 has taken place in sectors
characterized by both high and low tariff barriers. It is important to keep in
mind that the United States often engages in discussions about trade remedies
as a defensive measure, often against China. However, in this scenario, the
United States may be worried about the trade remedies that could be applied
against it and seek to strike down any misapplied anti-dumping duties. 181
Therefore, the recent Anti-Dumping Ruling in which China went as far as to
treat United States as a non-market economy needs to be viewed in this wider
canvas.182 For these reasons, the call made by the former United States Trade
Representative Robert E. Lighthizer in 2020 for a global reset of tariffs183 is
likely to find other allies who would support this stance.
Table 7: The Contingency Universe by Sectoral Interventions (01/01/1995
to 12/31/2019)184

Section

Description

Anti-Dumping Duty Interventions
by Importer Country
China

EU

India

U.S.

Countervailing Duties Interventions
by Importer Country

Total China

I

Animal
Products

2 (2)

8 (4)

15
(11)

61
(32)

1 (1)

II

Vegetable
Products

3 (1)

2 (2)

15
(10)

65
(38)

3 (1)

III

Animal or
Vegetable
Fats and Oils

IV

Prepared
Foodstuffs,
Beverages
and Tobacco

181

1 (0)

3 (1)

2 (1)

EU
3 (2)

India

U.S.

Total

4 (1)

16 (6)

4 (1)

13 (9)

15 (3)

10
(10)

80
(51)

8 (5)

2 (1)

12 (4)

Minsoo Lee, Donghyun Park & Aibo Cui, Invisible Trade Barriers: Trade Effects of US
Antidumping Actions against the People’s Republic of China, 1–21 (ADB Econ. Working Paper No. 378,
2013).
182
See generally Zhiguo Yu & Sandeep Thomas Chandy, The US is now a “Non-Market Economy”—
AntiDumping Ruling by China, INT’L ECON. L. POL’Y BLOG (July 18, 2020), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.
net/2020/07/the-us-is-now-a-non-market-economy-anti-dumping-ruling-by-china.html.
183
Ben Winck, The White House steps up trade aggression, calls for ‘broader reset’ of global tariffs,
BUS. INSIDER INDIA (June 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.in/stock-market/news/the-white-housesteps-up-trade-aggression-calls-for-broader-reset-of-global-tariffs/articleshow/76427243.cms.
184
Constructed by the authors from WTO ADA and SCM Databases.

38
(17)
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V

Mineral
Products

4 (4)

6 (6)

16 (7) 10 (4)

94
(59)

VI

Chemical
Products

151
(123)

97
(66)

398
(321)

99
(66)

1164
(836)

VII

Plastics and
Rubber

55
(45)

36
(20)

131
(104)

67
(42)

772
(495)

VIII

Leather
Products

4 (2)

IX

Wood
Products

9 (9)

15
(14)

5 (5)

110
(62)

X

Paper
Products

19
(16)

2 (2)

20
(12)

21
(15)

283
(168)

XI

Textiles and
Textile
Articles

7 (6)

43
(23)

98
(74)

19
(14)

409
(285)

XII

Footwear,
Headgear
etc.

9 (7)

1 (1)

XIII

Articles of
Stone,
Plaster,
Cement

17 (7)

29
(23)

XIV

Gems and
Jewelry

XV

Base Metals

25
(24)

198
(137)

115
(68)

390
1809
(285) (1289)

XVI

Machinery
and
Electrical
Equipment

3 (1)

58
(32)

96
(67)

39
(24)

453
(294)

XVII

Vehicles and
Transport
Equipment

2 (2)

11 (9)

8 (7)

10 (4)

65
(49)

XVIII

Various
Instruments

8 (5)

1 (2)

7 (6)

XIX

Arms and
Ammunition

2 (2)

VOL. 31 NO. 1

6 (3)
5 (3)

7 (5)

14 (9)

6 (2)

3 (2)

29
(16)

58
(31)

17 (9)

3 (1)

23
(14)

60
(28)

5 (0)

6 (4)

12 (5)

1 (1)

12 (8)

18
(10)

13 (5)

5 (3)

27 (9)

5 (2)

35
(23)

7 (5)

1 (0)

243
(157)

7 (2)

1 (0)

64
(40)

1 (0)

3 (1)

1 (0)
1 (1)

1 (1)

11 (3)

1 (0)

24
(12)

8 (3)

133
(89)

253
(159)

7 (5)

1 (1)

13 (9)

29
(20)

5 (2)

13 (6)

2 (1)
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284
(232)

Total

51

105
(75)

12 (3)

3 (2)

8 (7)

515
(332)

938
(706)

715
5833
13 (8)
(502) (3958)

86
(42)

22 (7)

4 (3)

5 (3)

260
(160)

577
(320)

Table 8: A Comparative Analysis of Trade Policy Outcome185
Trade Policy and
Outcome

Country
China*

185

1992-94

1995-00

2001-05

2006-10

2011-15

2016-19

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Exporter)

34.7

52.2

66.8

64.0

58.7

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Exporter)

25.3

38.8

50.0

45.2

55.0

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Importer)

5.3

23.4

10.6

8.6

18.0

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Importer)

3.3

17.0

13.4

7.2

13.3

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Exporter)

-

2.0

6.8

7.4

16.3

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Exporter)

-

2.0

6.8

7.4

16.3

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Importer)

-

-

2.0

1.5

1.7

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Importer)

-

-

2.0

2.0

1.0

Constructed by the authors from WTO, ADA, SCM Databases, and WITS. Note: In the last column,
the average trade Balance for China was computed for the 2016–2018 period.
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Trade Balance (USD
Billion)

EU

-0.82

28.90

71.04

312.45

466.58

522.43

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Exporter)

4.6

7.4

4.8

5.4

5.0

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Exporter)

2.5

6.0

2.4

5.2

3.7

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Importer)

36.3

21.8

18.6

11.8

9.3

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Importer)

24.7

14.0

10.8

7.4

6.0

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Exporter)

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

-

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Exporter)

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

-

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Importer)

8.0

3.3

3.0

3.8

3.0

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Importer)

4.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

1.7

-95.74

-259.22

-45.32

7.17

Trade Balance (USD
Billion)
India
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Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Exporter)

9.7

12.8

5.4

11.2

8.0

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Exporter)

5.5

6.2

5.4

5.0

6.7

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Importer)

28.8

51.0

41.0

27.4

44.3

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Importer)

19.5

40.2

26.6

24.2

32.3

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Exporter)

2.8

3.8

1.3

1.5

3.3
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Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Exporter)

2.8

3.8

1.3

1.5

3.3

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Importer)

-

-

1.0

1.0

9.5

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Importer)

-

-

-

-

3.0

-8.39

-18.16

-96.57

-151.59

-174.34

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Exporter)

15.2

14.6

11.8

9.6

7.3

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Exporter)

9.0

8.6

6.4

8.0

4.7

Anti-Dumping
Initiation (As Importer)

30.2

37.4

15.0

25.2

40.7

Anti-Dumping
Measure (As Importer)

22.8

21.0

12.8

10.8

35.7

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Exporter)

1.0

-

2.0

1.5

1.0

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Exporter)

1.0

-

2.0

1.5

1.0

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Initiation (As Importer)

6.7

6.4

6.6

14.8

21.7

Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measure (As Importer)

4.2

6.0

6.3

5.0

16.3

-324.29

-686.52

-893.43

-964.09

-1122.34

Trade Balance (USD
Billion)
United
States
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Trade Balance (USD
Billion)

-2.41

-166.58
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Trade Globalization is Not Ending—Trade is Changing

Events with long-term global ramifications, such as the United StatesChina Trade war and COVID-19 outbreak, often lead to transitions in supply
chains from one country to another.186 The United States-China trade war has
forced the world economy to witness major production and supply chain
uncertainty, as well as innovation risks.187 Gradually, the United States and
China have begun searching for alternatives to their dispute. Through signing
the Phase 1 Trade Agreement in January 2020, an acceleration of this trade
dispute was thwarted.188 This trade agreement was meant to be a first step in
a longer-term, phased stabilization of trade ties between the United States and
China, taking into account the key United States complaints regarding
Chinese economic practices.189 Although trade in the Phase 1 agreement is yet
to be fully developed, the settling of trade tensions between the United States
and China has been a boost to capital markets and has helped global economic
sentiment.
Along with sixteen other nations including China, the European Union
recently announced that it agreed to establish a body to bypass the United
States’ blockage of the appeals body of the WTO.190 The announcement notes
that the WTO’s working conflict resolution mechanism is of utmost
importance to the rules-based trading system. It also stated that an
autonomous and unbiased stage of appeal must continue to be one of its core
features. Regionalization is certainly a better option than economic
domination, but—relative to globalization—it would only be a second-best
approach which would lead to macroeconomic welfare losses.191
In light of the recent policy dynamics of key WTO members, a few
other points become evident from the earlier tariff negotiations trends. The
186
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major developed countries, e.g., the EU and United States, pressed for a low
coefficient for both developed and developing countries for two reasons. First,
the average tariff in developed countries had already dropped down to around
five percent. Second, the additional reforms, through adoption of a smaller
coefficient (say, lower than ten), was not going to threaten developed
countries in terms of immediate reductions in applied tariffs. Conversely, as
the average tariff in several developing countries (particularly in South and
East Asia and Africa) is generally above 10%192, the low coefficient of ten
would have obligated them to immediately and sharply reduce their applied
tariffs. In contrast, the formula proposed by China—who was forced to
undertake deep cuts in bound tariffs as a precondition before the 2001
accession—sought credit for early reforms. However, the developing
countries considered the possible forced reduction in applied tariff profile in
the period, after reforming their respective bound tariff lines, by implementing
the formula as a violation of SDT and threat to their sovereignty.193 Now, in
the post sub-prime crisis period, the average tariff has either remained
somewhat constant or is increasing in developed countries while showing an
increasing trend from 2015 onwards in their developing counterparts.194 The
failure to reach an agreement on the coefficient has lowered global welfare,
though has also served the protectionist intent of the individual countries.195
Additionally, thanks to the tariff overhang and with the deepening of
deglobalizing forces, the initial support for the sectoral initiative is likely to
wane in all countries. For instance, post COVID-19, given the disruption of
growth dynamics, the demand for tariff protections may intensify in many
countries and cut across the development profile. A rise in tariff protection in
2020–2021 has been noticed across major countries.196 Several countries have
already intervened to augment the consolidation of domestic manufacturing
players in the production process, as seen in China (“Made in China 2025”),197
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the European Union (“A New Industrial Strategy for Europe”), 198 India
(“Atmanirbhar [self-reliant] Bharat Abhiyan”) 199 and the United States
(“America First”). 200 Under these circumstances, even for the original
perpetrators of the sectoral initiative under NAMA, moving ahead will be a
tough decision. It is anticipated that the trade reforms under the wings of
existing RTAs may continue given the expected finite reciprocal benefits.
However, embracing the multilateral reforms would remain a more difficult
choice given the potential trade balance and labor market adjustment related
uncertainties.201
Finally, the perception in developing countries on the violation of SDT
and LTFR, as well as the perceived import threats, have been the major
reasons behind the stalemate at the NAMA negotiations. 202 It may be
acknowledged that the unbound tariff lines in developing countries (e.g.,
India) primarily consist of labor-intensive, low-to-modest competitive
segments. Binding these presently unbound lines by selecting a thin mark-up
and a “normal” year as the base, may lower the applied tariff on these
commodities. This, in turn, may end up deepening import flows. As many of
the low skill-intensive products are already characterized by trade deficits203
in India, this reform may also be politically difficult to accept.
CONCLUSION
The key question is, how strong is the urge for WTO-led manufacturing
tariff reforms in the current context? As this article explains, perceived selfinterest plays a crucial role in determining the quest for multilateralism. The
experience of the United States, the European Union, India, and China, in
terms of past tariff reforms and the reflected competitiveness patterns (i.e.,
DVA dynamics and trade balance scenario), indicate a close correspondence
198

See Strategy of Industrial Policy 2020 Vision, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2014–20),
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/policydocument/strategyindustrial-policy-2020-vision-epi-0.
199
See PM gives a clarion call for Atmanirbhar Bharat, PRESS INFO. BUREAU (May 12, 2020),
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1623391.
200
See David J. Lynch, Jeanne Whalen & Laurie McGinley, Trump takes a first step toward returning
medical supply chains to the U.S., WASHINGTON POST (July 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2020/05/19/trump-takes-first-step-toward-returning-medical-supply-chains-us/.
201
See Ashok Parikh, Relationship Between Trade Liberalization, Growth, and Balance of Payments
in Developing Countries: An Econometric Study, 20 INT’L TRADE J. 429, 435 (2006); see also Jiandong Ju,
Yi Wu & Li Zeng, The Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Trade Balance in Developing Countries, 57
IMF STAFF PAPERS 427, 428 (2010).
202
Ranjan, supra note 62, at vii–viii.
203
See Sakshi Aggarwal & Debashis Chakraborty, Labour Market Adjustment and Intra-Industry
Trade: Empirical Results from Indian Manufacturing Sectors, 15 J. S. ASIAN DEV. 238, 258 (2020).

FALL 2021

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

57

between the two. China as a “winner” has been open to the reform question,
while still trying to consolidate the existing advantages through its recent
domestic policy supports of the “Made in China 2025” initiative. The
negotiating standpoints of the other three countries discussed in this article,
have been shaped by their DVA dynamics and trade balance scenario. Both
the United States and India are keen on reviving their manufacturing segments
through concerted policy measures. Given the stagnation in the DVAs across
sectors, and the adverse trade balance scenario, it will be difficult for
developed countries such as the European Union and United States to accept
a relatively higher tariff profile for their developing counterparts. Yet, for
India, stagnation in DVA patterns, coupled with worsening trade deficits,
would compel the country to push for a dual coefficient at NAMA forums that
is in line with its past positions.
The perception of “fairness” of these practices in the exporting country
and the policy orientation in the importing country, complicates the
relationship further. The European Union and the United States are not the
first actors which have used the NME methodology toward China. The NME
methodology against China is already being used by many anti-dumping
organizations. The poor drafting of China’s WTO accession protocol provided
the probability that China’s market economy status would not be easy. In fact,
multiple legal assessments at the end of the 15-year transition period denied
automatic market economy treatment. Several WTO participants also have the
firm position that China has not made market reforms compliant with its WTO
obligations. India, however, has not officially taken a position on China's
NME status. There is no substantial opportunity or compulsion for other antidumping implementers to change their strategy automatically given the fact
that the corresponding WTO lawsuit has been postponed. For companies
pursuing anti-dumping concessions against Chinese imports, this may be a
welcome relief. The United States’ push for a “tariff reset” and India’s AD
activism on Chinese exports should be viewed in this wider context.
Thus, given the recent focus towards consolidation of domestic
manufacturing segments and the potential threats from augmented imports, it
is unlikely that WTO members would commit heavily on the NAMA front in
the multilateral forums. However, the revival of the WTO Appellate Body in
the post-Trump era and speedy resolution of the manufacturing tariff and
contingency measures disputes will be crucial to maintaining trust in the
multilateral reform process and revitalizing future negotiations.

